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*** SUMMARY 
i.  This  communication  seeks  to develop  and  expand  on  the 
objectives of the  Commission's  1979  memorandum  in the  light of the 
important  regulatory and  economic  changes  which  have  taken place  and  the 
renewed  debate  on  possible  improvements  in the European air transport 
system  in the  interest of consumers,  airlines and  workers  alike. 
The  paper  propt-•ses,  on  the basis of the Treaty of  Rome,  an overall 
framework  for  a  Community air transport policy,  designed  to  improve  the · 
efficiency and  profitability of  the air transport  industry as well  as  the 
quality and  price of the product it offers,  while at the  same  time 
maintaining  the  significant benefits  the present  system provides. 
However,  it accepts the  argument that a  system suitable for  application 
between  the  Member  States of the  Community  w~~l not  necessarily be 
suitable  for  application on  routes  to third countries.  The  policy 
proposals  therefore concentrate  on  air transport between  the  Member 
States as  a  step towards  the creation of  a  Community  market  in 
aviation  and  a  contribution to the  improvement  of the  internal market  in 
its wider  sense. 
ii.  The  paper  also meets  Parliament's request  for  a  revised 
work  programme  for  1984/1985.  Thus  it complements,  in  relation to air 
transport,  the  Commission's  1904/85  work  programme  on  inland  transport 
which  was  presented to the Council  in February  1903. 
iii.  The  Co~nission suggests that American-style deregulation 
would  not  work  in  the present European  context.  The  proposals  made  thus 
deal  only with  intra-Community air  transport~ 
maintain  the  structure of the present regulatory  system based  on 
bilateral intergovernmental  agreements  and  arrangements  and 
inter-airline co-operation,  but 
introduce  changes  to  make  it more  flexible  and  more  competitive  in 
order to increase airline efficiency,  allow the efficient and 
innovative airline to benefit,  encourage  expansion  and  thus 
employment -an·d  bet'"'ter-meet-consumer-needS.--- II -
iv.  The  central part of the  paper deals with  the  relationship 
between  competition policy  (and  in particular the  application of the 
competition articles of the  Treaty)  and  aviation policy.  The  paper  goes 
much  wider,  however,  and  covers other aspects of aviation policy also. 
v.  As  regards  competition the main  points of  the paper are  as 
follows 
a)  at the governmental  level, 
- in their bilateral agreements  and  arrangements  Governments  should 
not  intervene to influence the  share of the traffic carried 
by  their airlines'services to another  member  state unless it was 
down  to a  certain minimum  figure  (the  safety net principle). 
The  Commission's  proposed directive  on  the  regulation of air 
tariffs has been  amended  in order  to allow  a  variation in the 
degree  of  governmental  control  in accordance with  the  flexibility 
permitted to individual  airlines. 
b)  at the airline level,  it  proposes  to accept  for  a  limited period 
- capacity sharing  agreements  between airlines  (or  equivalent 
arrangements)  provided  they  do  not  enable  one  partner to dictate 
the  capacity to be  provided  by  the  other~ 
- revenue  pools  but  to  limit the degree of  revenue  transfers that 
can  be  made  under  them~ 
- air fare  consultation provided that dissenting airlines have  a 
right to propose  and  implement  tariffs independently of other 
airlines,  subject  to government  approval~ -III-
c)  as  a  complement  to its action on  competition the  Commission will 
review  the  state aids  given  to airlines in  accordance  with  the 
guidelines developed  in  this paper.  This  is necessary  in order  to 
avoid  any  increase  in competition  between airlines  leading to  a 
subsidy race  between  governments  (Annex  IV): 
d)  in terms  of  implementation it proposes  the  following  package 
- a  decision under article 84.2  providing  for  rules  covering 
bilateral  agreements  and 
arrangements  (Annex  I): 
-amendments  to the  Commission's  proposal  under  article 84.2  for  a 
tariff directive  (Annex  II): 
-new proposals  under  article 87  for  the  application of  the Treaty's 
competition  rules  to air transport  (Annex  III). 
In  view of  the  limitation of  the obligations  proposed  under 
article 84.2  to Member  States of the  Community  and  the  close 
interrelationship of action at  governmental  and  commercial  levels, 
the  action proposed  under  article 87  has  a  similar geographical  scope. 
Since all the  above  proposals  are  interdependent it is necessary 
in order  to ensure  the  regulatory  system  is compatible with  the Treaty 
that  they  are  adopted  by  the  Council  and  the  Commission  and  implemented, 
as  a  package. 
The  Commission  realises  that it will  take  time  to discuss  these 
ideas before  they  can  be  accepted.  This  period  should not  be  too  long  and 
it preserves  the  freedom  to  initiate direct action against practices  of 
airlines which  in its view are  in violation of the  competition articles. - IV  -
vi.  Other  aspects  of aviation policy covered  in this paper 
concern  inter alia  : 
- a  proposal  for  standstill and  non-discrimination provisions  (Annex  V) 
- initiatives designed  to help  reduce  airline costs  (e.g.  airport 
charges,  facilitation)r 
initiatives to  stimulate the activities of  smaller airlines and  charter 
airlines 
- proposal  for  the  mutual  recognition of  licences. 
vii.  The  Commission's  work  programme  for  1984/86  is at 
annex  VI • 
..  ~ --
viil..  The  Commission  believes that if measures  along  these  lines 
are  adopted,  it will,  whilst  avoiding disruption in the aviation 
industry,  lead gradually to a  more  efficient and  cost-effective system,  a 
better deal  for  the  consumer,  a  healthier industry,  and  consequently 
better chances  for  employment  and  as  a  result to a  strengthening of the 
ties between  Member  States  and  an  improvement  to the  Community's  internal 
market. PROGRESS  TOWARDS  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  A  COMMUNITY 
AIR  TRANSPORT  POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  In July 1979,  the  Commission  issued  a  memorandum  on  the 
contribution of  the  European  Communities  to the  development 
of air transport  services  (1).  One  purpose  of this  memorandum 
was  to create  a  debate  on  the  contents of  a  common  air 
transport policy  for  the  EEC.  Since  then  the  Commission has 
received  numerous  comments  and  has  had  a  number-of  informal 
discussions  on  them.  several  proposals,  inter alia on  air 
tariffs,  interregional air  services  and  the  procedure  for  the 
application of  the  competition articles to civil aviation 
have  been  made  to the  Council  and  have  been or are  being 
discussed  by  it,  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Economic 
and  Social  Committee. 
2.  In  the  Commission's  view it is  now  time  for  a  more 
comprehensive  statement of its attitude  towards  air transport 
in  the  Community.  The  growth  of  consumer  criticism of  the 
system  in  Europe,  the  effect of  the  recession  on  airlin• 
finances  and  the  development  of deregulated air transport  in 
the u.s.  have  combined  to stimulate  a  debate  on  whether  the 
present  European air transport  system best  serves  the 
interests of  the  consumers  or,  in the  long-term,  of  the 
airlines  themselves;  and  whether  indeed  the  present  system is 
compatible with  the Treaty of  Rome.  The  purpose  of this paper 
is,  therefore,  to  review  the  developments  that have  taken 
place  since  1979,  to propose  an  overall  framework  for air 
transport policy  in the  Community,  to describe  the  measures 
which  the  Commission  proposes  and  the  actions which  it has  in 
mind  to take.  The  Commission  wishes  to  acknowledge  the help 
it has  derived  in  the  formulation  of the  paper  from  the 
Report  on  Competition  in  Intra-EuropeaQ_Ai_r_  __ S_er_v_ices--prepa-r-ed-
--------- -·  ------ -·- ----- -~--- ----
by  the  European Civil Aviation  Conference. 
(1)  "Air Transport  :  A  Community  Approach",  Bulletin of the  European 
Communities,  supplement  5/79. - 2  -
3.  In the  long-term the objective of  a  Community air transport 
policy must  be  the creation of  a  common  air transport 
market.  This  will  take  a  long  time  to achieve.  The  Commission 
takes  the  view,  however,  that in the  shorter  term it is 
possible and  desirable to relax  the  existing  system.  Such  a 
relaxation would  result in  a  wider  variety of choice  for  the 
consumer,  lower  costs  and  therefore  lower prices,  more  scope 
and  more  profits  for  the efficient and  innovative airline and 
a  growth  stimulus  to the air transport  industry.  In  the 
long-term this will provide  more  jobs  and  contribute  towards 
the  coherence  of the  internal market.  The  Commission  further 
believes that this relaxation can  take place without  losing 
the  significant benefits which  the present  system of air 
transport has  so  far provided to the  Member  States of the 
Community;  that it can  be  so  organised that the  Community  and 
its Member  States can,  acting together,  control the process 
of change  and  ensure  that national,  social  and  economic 
objectives are  safeguarded;  and  that at the  same  time  the 
internal  Community  market  as  a  whole  can  be  promoted  in a  way 
that would  not  be possible,  or at least would  be  much  more 
difficult,  for  Member  States acting  individually. - 3  -
PART  1 
REACTIONS  TO  THE  FIRST  MEMORANDUM 
COMMUNITY  INSTITUTIONS 
4.  The  European  Parliament declared  in  two  Resolut:ons  (1) 
that air transport  in the  Community  can  and  must  be 
improved  and  that Community  measures  should  be  adopted  to 
that end.  However,  it drew attention to the  extremely 
complex  nature of air transport  and  its extensive 
international  ramifications  and  considered that while 
reform is necessary,  this  should  not put  the basic 
structure at risk.  It invited the  Commission  to  formulate 
appropriate proposals  on  : 
i.  measures  to  remove  restrictions  on  competition,  in 
particular with  regard  to  : 
- state subsidies, 
- fixed  exchange  rates, 
- simplification of  formalities, 
ii.  measures  to facilitate and  promote  the  integration of 
air transport  : 
-harmonisation of  technical  regulations  (2), 
- compensation  in the  case  of overbooking{2), 
- regulations  on  charter traffic, 
iii. phased  introduction of measures  at the  European 
level,  in particular  : 
- full  implementation of  the  competition provisions, 
- access  to  the market, 
- freedom  of  establishment. 
TfTEuropean-Parffamerif;·Iiesofuffoi:i"ori-iestrTctfons  of-competlt~on 
in the air transport sector,  OJ  No  c  291,  10.11.1980,  p.60  and 
Resolution  on  the  Memorandum· of the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities  on  the contribution of the European  Communities  to 
the  development  of air transport  services,  OJ  No  C  219, 
10.11.1980,  p.  65. 
(2)  Action  on  these  two  points  is not  contained  in part.3 of this 
Memorandum but will if necessary be  taken  up  later. - 4  -
In addition to this programme  of action the  Parliament was  of 
the  opinion that  no  viable alternative had  yet been proposed 
to the present  system  for  fixing  tariffs and  that the 
Commission  should study this question further. 
5.  Other points  made  by  Parliament  include  the  following 
i.  efforts must  be  made  to bring  about  a  real  increase  in 
competition  in air transport  in the  Community  which 
would  benefit users while promoting  the productivity and 
competitiveness of the airlines  and  the  economy of the 
Community  as  a  whole.  In this context,  it called  upon 
the  Commission  to adopt  as  quickly  as  possible  a 
proposal  on  the  application of  the  competition  rules of 
the Treaty to air transport.At the  same  time it held 
that the  extension of these  rules  to the air transport 
sector  should be  a  gradual  and  judicious  process  in 
order to allow  Community air transport  companies  to 
adjust to the  new  situation and  thus  to avoid  a  loss of 
competitiveness  in Community,  other  European  and 
intercontinental markets. 
ii.  In many  cases  the air transport sector provides  services 
of overriding public  interest and  this aspect  should be 
taken  into account  when  deciding  on  the  implementation 
of the  competition articles; 
iii.  The  social aspects  of  any  common  air transport policy 
should  be  taken  into account. 
6.  Beyond  these  two  basic  resolutions,  Parliament has  expressed 
the  view  that  : 
i.  regional  services  should be  encouraged; 
ii.  _t_~:  p::_es~_nt _high  safe.b'_le_v:el  .. -shou-ld--not  be put at risk. 
On  this aspect the  European  Parliament  approved  an  own 
initiative report,  in particular on  the  safety aspects 
of cabin  equipment. - 5  -
7.  The  Economic  and Social Committee has  in general 
taken  a  more  conservative  approach  to the  establishment of a 
common  air transport policy.  The  Committee  found  it 
necessary that a  common  air transport policy  should  be 
created  and  that it should  be  coordinated with  the  common 
transport policy but it urged  caution.  In particular it did 
not  s~e any  short-term advantage  to the  Community  in changing 
the prasent regulatory  system,  but  found  that the  long-term 
aim  should  be  the  introduction of  a  more  competitive  regime  in 
the  interests of both  the  consumer  and  a  healthy civil 
aviation  industry.  The  Committ~e considered that many  of the 
formalities still in existence  in  the  Member  States were 
superfluous  and  thought  that controls  and  handling procedures 
should be  made  more  flexible.  It also.  ·was  strongly concerned 
about  safety.  It considered  that  the  1979  memorandum  was  not 
sufficiently sensitive to the  interests of airlines  employees 
and  suggested  consideration of action  on  several  specific 
points designed  to take  account of  these social  aspects.  (1) 
8.  The  Council noted,  without detailed discussion, 
the  Commission's  memorandum  and  invited it to concentrate its 
efforts as  a  matter of priority on  a  proposal  on  frontier 
crossing  interregional air services.  The  Council  also 
requested  its committee  of permanent  representatives  to 
examine  in detail  the other  items  enumerated  in  the Council's 
1978  priority programme  on  air transport.  An  account  on  the 
Council's  further  action is given  in paragraphs  21  to  32. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  230,  8.9.1980,  p.  30. - 6  -
AIRLINES 
9.  The  reactions  from airlines can  be  divided  into two  broad 
groups. 
10.  The  first group  is represented by  the Association of European 
Airlines  (AEA)  which,  although it in  1980  welcomed  the 
Commission's  efforts to promote  European air transport, 
considered that the  present  system is to  a  large  extent 
adequate  and  pointed out  the  risk of  undermining  the  system's 
strengths  in the  attempt  to correct its deficiencies.  The  AEA 
expressed  doubts  about  the Commission's  initiative on 
interregional air services  and  questioned  in particular their 
economic  viability.  It concluded  that national aviation 
authorities  should  continue to control market  entry and  the 
establishment of particular routes.  The  EEC  members  of  the 
AEA  expressed cautious  approval  of the  Commission's  approach 
to air fares,  competition  and  the general  economic 
development  of airlines.  While  not  opposed  in principle to 
lower  fares  or greater competition,  these airlines drew 
attention to the  current precarious  financial  position of air 
carriers and  to the  importance  of fair competition.  They  felt 
that priority should  be  given  to problems  of air traffic 
control,  air traffic congestion,  fuel  allocation  and  changes 
in infrastructure.  This  point of view has  been  confirmed  in 
September  1983. 
11.  These  and  other  opinions  expressed  individually by  some 
airlines  amount  to  a  strong  recommendation  to the Commission 
that  any  change  in the present  system  should  be 
evolutionary.  In  a  hearing before  the  European  Parliament  the 
International Air Transport Association  (lATA)  (1)  considered 
that the  memorandum  was  a  constructive working  document.  lATA 
felt,  however,  that the  CommissiJn's  proposals  on  fares, 
capacity,  productivity and  competition were  based  on 
(1)  P.E.  64.942  of  5.5.1980. - 7 -
inconclusive  evidence  and  required  further  study and  that the 
problems  in air transport rather concerned planning  and 
management. 
12.  On  the other hand  the Association of Independent Air Carriers 
(ACE)  welcomed  the  Commission's  ideas  and  stressed the 
importance  of quick action to avert  a  further  strengthening 
of  dominant  positions.  ACE  offered its collaboration and 
urged  the  Commission  to eliminate  in particular existing 
differences  between  scheduled  and  non-scheduled  carriers in 
the  field of cargo  and  mail  services. 
EMPLOYEE  ORGANIZATIONS 
13.  The  transport  employee  organizations  felt that the  memorandum 
had  paid  insuffic·ient attention to social  problems of  the 
industry.  They  urged  in particular the  creation of  a  joint 
committee  between workers  and  employers  under  the  auspices  of 
the  Commission.  They  feared  that  a  more  flexible civil 
aviation policy could  lead to anarchy  in the  air,  the  costs 
of which  would  ultimately have  to be  borne  by  taxpayers  and 
airline users.  They  therefore called  for  more  detailed 
studies of the  consequences  of greater flexibility.  They  also 
saw  no  evidence  of  any  intention to  include civil aviation 
policy  into an  overall  Community  transport policy which  would 
balance  needs  and  contributions of  the  various  sectors. 
USER  ORGANIZATIONS 
14.  User  organizations generally  supported  the  memorandum.  Some, 
however,  complained of excessive  caution  on  the part of  the 
Commission  and  of insufficient coverage  of  such  problems  as 
air safety,  pollution,  the  role  of air travel  in the 
Community's  regional  policy  and  the  relationship of air 
transport to the co-ordinated  development of an  overall 
European -transport  system.  Much  of  the  users'  dissatisfaction 
is centred on  the  level  and  the present  system of  fixing  air 
tariffs.  More  competition  and  changes  in the tariff fixing 
system are necessary  in their view. - 8  -
INTERGOVERNMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS 
15.  The  International Civil Aviation Organization  (ICAO)  stated 
in  a  hearing before  the  European  Parliament  (1)  that 
improvement  of technical  and operational problems  such  as 
obtain~ng more  direct routings at optimum flight  levels  and 
with minimal  delays  could only be  satisfactorily resolved by 
the  international and  regional machinery  of  ICAO.  The 
Organization also deemed  European air safety satisfactory. 
(1)  PE  64.992  of  7.5.1980 - ~ -
PART  2 
DEVELOPl-1ENTS  SINCE  THE  FIRST  t-1El-10RANDUt-1 
ECONOI'HC  DEVELOPHENTS 
16.  The  first memorandum  described  the  relative importance of the 
different markets  of  the  European airlines  :  intra-Community 
markets  were  of  less  importance  for  most  Community  airlines 
than  non-Community  markets.  This  situation still persists. 
Major  scheduled airlines  (1)  earn  about  40%  of their revenue 
in  local  Europe  (about  25%  in the  Community)  and  the rest on 
routes  to other international destinations,  in particular on 
intercontinental routes.  In air freight  earnings,  the 
percentage attributable to  local Europe  is in the  region  of 
20%.  At  the  time  of the  first memorandum  non-scheduled 
carriers also earned  a  small  part of their revenue  from 
services  inside  the  Community while  the  main  part  came  from 
services  to other  international destinations,  in particular 
in  Europe  and  on  the  North Atlantic.  With  the  advent of 
aggressive pricing policies of  the  scheduled carriers over 
the  :·Jorth  Atlantic  charter traffic there declined 
considerably.  1\s  a  consequence  the activity of  EEC 
non-scheduled carriers is  now  concentrated  on  European 
destinations,  in particular Spain,  and  they  provide  over  50% 
of  the  total  number  of passenger  miles  flown  in  local  Europe 
17.  For  practically the  whole  period  since  the  first memorandum 
was  published,  the air transport sector in  general has been 
in  a  severe  recession.  The  EEC  scheduled airlines have  done 
no  worse,  and  indeed have  sometimes  done  rather better,  than 
airlines outside  the  EEC.  The  figures  below set out  the 
operating statistics of  the total  international  scheduled 
operations of  EEC  carriers as  supplied  to the  Commission  by 
A.I'..A. 
\'I")EEC-scheduled  airlines,  f·~embers of AEA  (Association of European 
Airlines) - 10  -
These  11  major  carriers which  together  form  the  bulk of 
international  scheduled air transport operating within,  to 
and  from  the  Community  countries  thus  failed  to  cover 
their operating costs  and  interest charges  in  1981  and 
failed  to cover  part of their interest charges  in  1982. 
Indications  are  that  1983  results will  be  marginally 
better than  1982.  The  Commission  understands  that although 
the operating ratios  show  signs of  improvement  interest 
charges will  again  not  be  fully  covered. 
18.  In order to cover  their interest charges  and  their 
dividend  commitments  and  to  renew  their aircraft fleets, 
the airlines have  calculated that  a  minimum  profit 
requirement,  before  tax,  is  7.5  percent of revenue.  This 
translates into an  operating ratio before  interest of 
108.1.  Only  one  or  two  of  the  carriers  came  within  four 
points of what  they  consider  to be  a  minimum  reasonable 
operating ratio before  interest in  198l.On that basis,  the 
10  airlines were  short of their  necessary  earnings  levels 
by  about  US$  1,250  million  in  1981  and  a  little under  US$ 
800  million  in  1982.  The  1983  shortfall  is  expected  to be 
slightly  lower  than  in  1982.(1) 
19.  The  10  carriers  (2)  for  which  figures  are available  and 
which  provide  scheduled  passenger  services within  local 
Europe  have  fared  no better in that region  than  in total 
operations,  within  recent years.  1981  and  1982  data  are 
the  latest available  for  that  region.  In  terms  of 
individual  operating  ratios  for  passenger  services,  the 
picture  is as  follows: 
(1)  Indications at the  time  of  going  to press  are  that this 
assessment  may  turn out  to be  too pessimistic 
(2)  Aer  Lingus,  Air  France,  Alitalia,  British Airways,  British 
Caledonian,  KLM,  Lufthansa,  Olympic  Airways,  Sabena,  SAS - 11  -
AEA/EEC  Carriers'Traffic and Economic Results  1981  and  1982  1) 
I. Total  International  Scheduled services 
A.l.  Available  tone-kms  (ATK's)  mill 
2.  Revenue  tonne-kms  (RTK's)  mill 
3.  Load  factor  % 
4.  Revenue  passenger-kms  mill 
5.  Freight  ~onne-kms  mill 
6.  Mail  tonn~-kms  mill 
B.l.  Yield per  revenue  tonne-kms  UScents 
2.  Cost  per available  tonne-kms  UScents 
3.  Operating  revenues  US$  mill 
a)  percentage passenger  revenues  % 
b)  percentage  freight  revenues  % 
c)  percentage mail  revenues  % 
4.  Operating  costs  US$  mill 
5.  Operating result profit/loss 
before  financial  charges  US$ 
6.  Interest charges  US$ 
7.  Operating  costs after  financial 
charges  US$ 
8.  Operating result profit/loss 
after  financial  charges  US$ 
9.  Operating  ratio before  financial 
charges 
10.  Operating  ratio after financial 
charges 
II.  Total  Scheduled  Passenger  Services 
1.  Total  available  seat-kms 
a)  domestic 
b)  local  Europe 
c)  total international 
2.  Revenue  passenger-kms 
a)  domestic 
b)  local  Europe 
c)  total international 
mill 
mill 
mill 
mill 
% 
% 
mill 
mill 
mill 
mill-
mill 
mill 
mill 
mill 
1981 
31686 
19699 
62.2 
135468 
7212 
466 
70.15 
44.00 
13818 
81.1 
17.2 
l.  7. 
13942 
- 124 
569 
145ll 
- 693 
99.1 
95.2 
234897 
19279 
47557 
215618 
1484ll 
12944 
27293 
135467 
1982 
32694 
20124 
61.6 
134343 
7246 
466 
68.56 
41.18 
13798 
81.3 
17.0 
1.7 
13463 
+  335 
650 
14ll3 
- 315 
102.5 
97.8 
234315 
2ll2l 
46962 
213194 
148947 
14451 
26761 
134496 
(1)  Aer  Lingus,  Air  France,  Alitalia,  British Airways,  British 
Caledonian,  KLM,  Lufthansa,  Olympic  Airways,  Sabena,  SAS,  UTA. ---12-
RANGES  OF  LOCAL  EUROPE  OPERATING  RATIOS  (PASSENGER 
SERVICES)  BEFORE  INTEREST 
Year  0Eeratin9 ratio - ran9e  0Eerating ratio 
1978  88.9  - 110.2  103.0 
1979  93.3  - 110.9  103.4 
1980  79.3  - 104.4  98.3 
1981  79.7  - 104.1  98.7 
1982  89.1 - 110.0  103.9 
- mean 
As  the table  shows  there are wide  variations  in the 
financial  performance of those air carriers in Europe  and 
some  of  them are  under  considerable  financial  strain. 
CHANGES  IN  THE  U.S.  REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK 
20.  Undoubtedly the  most  sweeping  changes  in the  regulatory 
framework  were  made  in the United States where 
far-reaching  legislation was  enacted  in late  1978  removing 
any  governmental  regulation on  domestic air transport  in 
respect of market  entry,  capacity regulation  and  pricing. 
It is probably too early to  say what  the  final result of 
deregulation will be.  The  adjustment to the  new  regime  by 
the  established carriers has  taken  longer  and  proved  more 
difficult than was  expected,  though it seems  that most  of 
them will be  able to cope.  With  the  expansion of the 
secondary market  the  choice  open  to the  consumers  and  the 
general public satisfaction with  the  system have 
increased.  The  relevance of this policy change  for  the 
European market  is discussed at paragraph  43. - 13  -
POLICY  PROPOSALS  TO  THE  COUNCIL  OF  MINISTERS 
Consultation procedure 
21.  As  the  Commission  emphasized  in its 1979  memorandum,  the 
interrelation between  the  Community  and  the  world  air 
transryort  system is  important.  There  is therefore  a 
need tJ establish  a  greater coherence  in the  actions of 
Member  States  towards  international organizations  and  third 
countries.  The  Commission  consequently  together with  the 
f.1emorandum  sent to the Council  in July  1979  a  proposal  for 
a  consultation procedure with  respect  to international 
organizations  and  third countries.  This  was  supported  by  the 
European  Parliament  in its resolutiop. on  the  memorandum of 
the  Commission  of the  E.C.  on  the Contribution of  the  E.C.  to 
the  development of air transport services  {l).The Council 
adopted  a  decision  in  December  1979  (2)  but did not agree  to 
ex-ante consultations  on  the  conclusion of bilateral 
agreements. 
Aircraft noise 
22.  In  December  1979  the  Council  also  approved  a 
Directive proposed by  the  Commission  on  the  limitation of 
noise  emissions  from  subsonic  aircraft  (1).  The  purpose  of 
the  proposal  was  to  implement  through  Community  legislation 
Annex  16  to  the  Chicago Convention.  This  was  agreed  and 
recently  (3)  - as  envisaged  in Annex  16  itself - application 
to subsonic  aircraft  from  third countries has  been  made 
mandatory. 
m-o.r·"NaC291,  10.11  19Bo,  p.Gs. 
(2)  OJ  No  L  18,  24.1.1980,  P•  24 
{3)  OJ.No  L  18,  24.1.1980,p.26  and  amendment  OJ.No  L  117,  4.5.1983, 
p.  15. - 14  -
23.  The  Commission  submitted  in  1981  to the  Council  a  proposal 
for  a  Directive  (1)  on  the  limitation of noise  emissions  from 
helicopters.  The  purpose  of  this proposal  is to  make 
mandatory within  the  Community,  the  noise  standards  on 
helicopters  described  in  Annex  16  to the  Chicago  Convention. 
No  agreement  has  yet  been  reached  because  of the  difference 
of viewpoints  about  the  limits of  the  scope  and  the 
stringency of  these  noise  s~andards.  The  progress  made  at the 
last meeting  of  the  ICAO  Committee  on  Aircraft Noise  wL,l,  it 
is  like~y,  allow  an  international  agreement  to be  achieved  on 
that  item  in  1984/1985. 
24.  The  Commission  has  also  developed  a  specific  computer 
programmme  CANAR  (consequence  of aircraft noise  abatement 
regulation)  for  calculating  and  plotting  noise  exposure 
contours  around  airports. 
search  and  Rescue  co-operation 
25.  In  1979  the  German  Government  proposed  to the  Council  a 
Directive  for  co-operation between  Member  States with  respect 
to  search  and  rescue  activities  in  ~1ember States'  frontier 
zones  in  the  case  of actual  or  suspected air accidents. 
However,  agreement  could  not  be  reached  and  the  Council  asked 
the  Commission  to  study  the  matter  further.  Detailed 
consultation  was  held  with  national  experts which  enabled  the 
Commission  to determine  areas  of co-operation  and  the  extent 
to which  Community  rules  might  help  implement  important 
aspects  of Annex  12  to the  Chicago  Convention. 
-----------
(1)  OJ.No  C  275,  27.10.1981,  p.2 - 15 -
Accident  investigation 
26.  In  December  1980  the  Council  approved  a  proposal  of the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  concerning  future  co-operation 
and mutual  assistance between  Member  States  in the  field 
of air accident  investigation  (l).The Council  Directive 
was  much  reduced  in  scope  compared  to the original 
proposal  but it is to be  hoped  that even  in its reduced 
form it will  lead  to a  better utilisation of equipment  and 
easier access  to appropriate expertise. 
Interregional air services 
27.  The  Commission  proposed  a  regulation on  interregional air 
services  in  November  1980  (2)  following  the Council's 
invitation in the  context of its discussion of  the 
Commission's  memorandum.  The  Commission  did  not  advocate 
complete  freedom  of access  to  the  market  but  in effect 
proposed  to lift a  specific and  precisely defined  segment 
of  the  market  out of the bilateral structure  and  thus  to 
give  opportunities  to more  airlines  to operate certain 
routes  outside the  trunk  routes.  The  proposal  was 
supported by  the  European  Parliament  (3),  the  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  (4),  the  Chambers  of  Commerce,  the 
European  Regional Airlines Organisation  (ERA),  users .and 
independent airlines.  Other parties  such  as  the 
representatives of Civil Aviation  Unions,  the  Centre  of 
European  Public  Enterprises  (CEEP)  and  the  major  airlines 
either opposed it outright or had  certain reservations  on 
its  scope.  In  the course of  the  discussions  the 
Commission's  original proposal has  been  considerably 
watered  down  and  although  the  Council  has  now  passed  a 
directive  (5)  it is questionable  how  much  effect it will 
have  in its modified  version. 
(1)  OJ  No  L  375,  31.12.1980,  p.32 
(2)  COM(80)624  final of  27  November  1980  and  amendment  COM(81)771 
final of  10  December  1981 
(3)  OJ  No  C  287,  9.11.1981,  p.  114 
(4)  OJ  No  c  343,  31.12.1981,  p.  13 
(5)  OJ  No  L  237,  26.8.1983,  p.  19 - 16  -
Air tariffs 
28.  In July  1980  the  Council  invited the  Commission,  as  did 
Parliament,  to  submit  a  report  on  the  level  of  and  the 
procedures  for  fixing air fares  for  scheduled carriers in 
the  Community.  The  Commission  submitted its report  (1)  one 
year  later and  pointed out  in particular that although  in 
certain cases  an  abuse  of market  positions  could  not  with 
certainty be  excluded·,  in  general  for  operations  in the 
Community  neither the  level of air  fares  nor  the profits 
of the airlines were  excessive  in relation to·the costs 
they  incurred.  It concluded  moreover  that  improvements 
could  be  made  in procedures  for  the  fixing  of air tariffs 
both  as  regards  government  supervision of tariff fixing 
and  the  fixing  of tariffs by  the airlines  themselves. 
29.  In  1981  the  Commission  sent  to the  Council  a  proposal  for 
a  directive on  tariffs for  scheduled air transport between 
Member  States  {2).  This  has  been  discussed  in  the  Council 
for  well  over  two  years,  but  there  is  no  indication that a 
Council  decision  can  be  expected  in the  near  future. 
However,  some  Member  States have  expressed  general 
support,  while  objecting  to certain specific  features.  The 
European  Parliament has  in general  supported  the  proposal, 
but  suggested  several  amendments  {3).The  Economic  and 
Social  Committee,  while  welcoming  its objectives  did  not 
believe that  the  proposal  in its present  form  was  likely 
to achieve  them  {4).  This  matter  is discussed  further  in 
paragraph  48  et al. 
(1)  COM{81)398  final  of  23  July  1981 
(2)  OJ  No  C  78,  30.3.1982,  p.  6 
(3)  OJ  No  C  322,  28.ll.l983,  p.  10 
(4)  OJ  No  C  77,  21.3.1983,  P•  27. - 17  -
Application of the competition rules of the.Treaty to air 
transport 
30.  Although it follows  from  Court  of Justice rulings  in  1974 
{1),  and  1978  {2),  that  the  general  rules of the Treaty, 
including  the  competition  rules,  are  applicable to air and 
sea transport,  these  ar~ in fact  the only areas  for  which 
competition  regulations  in application of article 87  of the 
Treaty do  not yet exist.  The  European  Parliament  in its 
resolution on  restrictions of competition in the air 
transport sector urged  the  Commission  "to work  for  the 
application of the provisions  on  competition  in the  EEC 
Treaty with  the  necessary derogations"  (3).  In August  1981 
the  Commission  introduced  to the  Council  a  proposal  for  a 
regulation  on  the  application of the  competition  rules of the 
Treaty to air transport which  would  have  given  to the 
Commission  the  means  of obtaining  the  information  required 
for  decisions  under articles  85  and  86  of the  Treaty  (4).  The 
proposal  is of  a  purely procedural  nature.  It has  been 
discussed  several  times  in the Council's  joint transport  and 
economic  policy working  group.  The  principal criticisms 
emerging  from  these  discussions  concerned  the  geographic 
scope  of  the proposal  (application to routes  to third 
countries  in addition to intra community  routes)  and  the 
absence  of  any  method  for  according  a  group  exemption  to the 
existing commercial  agreements  or concerted practices between 
enterprises. 
-- - - - ._  -
(1)  Judgement  of  the  Court  of  4  April  1974,case  167/73 
( 2)  Judgement  of  the  Court  of  12  October  1978,  case  156/77 
(3)  OJ  No  c  291,  10.11.1980,  P·  60. 
(4)  OJ  No  c  291,  12.11.1981,  P·  4. - 18  -
31.  In order  to develop  its policy approach  and  to take  into 
account  the  real  features  of the air transport  system in the 
Community  the  Commission  wrote  to the  t1ember  States  and  to 
airlines with  the purpose of obtaining detailed  information 
on  the  present air transport  system  (1).  The  Commission  has 
requested  supplementary  information.  This  matter  is discussed 
further  in part  3. 
Express  low weight air cargo 
.32.  In  August  1980  the  U.K.  Government  presented  in  the  Council  a 
proposal  for  a  directive on  the  liberalisation of regulations 
for  express  low weight  air cargo  services.  The  Council  could 
not  agree  because  of  the  insufficient information at its 
disposal  and  therefore  requested  the  Commission  in July  1981 
(2)  to  study  the  matter  further  and  recommended  meanwhile  to 
the  Member  States to facilitate this  type  of  transport  as 
much  as  possible.  The  Commission  has  examined  the  matter with 
national  experts  and  is  new  preparing  a  modified  proposal 
which will  be  submitted  to  the  Council  this year. 
OTHER  ACTION  BY  THE  COMr1ISSION  SINCE  THE  FIRST  r.lEMORANDUM 
State aids 
33.  The  Commission  services  convened  a  series of meetings  with 
experts  from  Member  States during  1981  and  1982,  in order  to 
know  exactly the  contents  of  state aids  to air transport.  As 
part of these  meetings  the  Commission  has  been  able  to 
develop  a  picture  of  aids  to airlines.  This  matter  is 
discussed  further  in paragraph  61  et al. 
(1)  SG(81)  D/10641  of  7  August  1981 
(2)  OJ  No  L  203,  23.7.1981,  p.  51. - 19  -· 
Facilitation of air freight transport· 
34.  The  Council has  identified this matter as  a  priority.  A  study 
was  carried out  for  the  Commission  and  followed  by  a  se~ies 
of visits to the  main airports of the  Community  in 
co-operation with  the  lATA  Facilitation Committee.  The 
purpose of this exercise was  to determine where  obstacles to 
the  free  movement  of air freight exist in the  Community. 
35~  The  results of the  study  suggest that air freight  is not only 
more  expensive  than other modes  of transport,  but  takes 
longer  on  many  routes within the  Community  than  road 
transport.  The  cause  can be  found,  for  example,  in 
time-consuming procedures  for  cross-border purposes,  handling 
procedures,  communication  between airlines,  shippers,  freight 
forwarders  and  customs  services,  etc.  These difficulties 
seriously inhibit the  development  of  intracommunity air cargo 
services.  Future  action is considered  in paragraph  71  et al. 
Safety 
36.  In  the  field of air safety the  Commission has  not  the 
expertise  for  any  action on  its part.  Its role  can be  only to 
draw attention to areas  where  in its view  the  existing 
system,  based  on  Member  States  and  the  ICAO  regional 
organisation,  might  be  improved.  With  this  limited objective 
in  view it has  signed  a  co-operation agreement  with 
Eurocontrol  {about  which  the European  Parliament  expressed 
its satisfaction  (1))  and  has  had  a  study carried out  on  the 
constraints that exist on  the  development  of air transport. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  182,  19.7.1982,  p.  29. - 20  -
Right of establishment 
37.  It is disappointing  to note  that since  the  first memorandum 
no airline has  availed itself of this possibility offered by 
the Treaty. 
Users 
38.  The  services of the  Commission have  encouraged  the  creation 
of  national  committees  of air transport  users.  Such 
associations  already existed in  some  Member  States  and  under 
the  initiative of  the  British Committee  (AUC  - Air  Transport 
Users  Committee)  a  steering committee  was  formed,  consisting 
of  representatives of  most  Member  States.  Associations 
representing business  and  leisure air travellers have  then 
been  established in  Ireland,  Italy and  Belgium and  are  in the 
process  of  formation  in other Member  States.  These 
representatives decided  in October  1982  to merge  into the 
Federation of Air  Transport  User  Representatives  in the 
European  Community  (Faturec),  the objectives of  which  are  to 
establish and  maintain  in each  Member  State  a  committee  the 
purpose  of  which  shall  be  to  further  the  interests of all 
kinds of air transport users.  It is naturally  in  the  interest 
of  the  Commission  that  these  organisations  be  associated with 
consumer  organisations  in the  EEC.  The  Commission  intends  to 
consult all users  organisations  interested in air transport. - 21  -
PART  3 
COMMISSION  INITIATIVES  FOR  THE  FURTHER  FORMULATION  AND  IMPLEMENTATION 
OF  THE  OBJECTIVES  OF  AIR  TRANSPORT  POLICY 
BASIC  CONSIDERATIONS  CONCERNING  A  COMMOU  AIR  TRANSPORT 
POLICY 
39.  The  reactions  to the  first memorandum  and  the wider 
discussion  on  European civil aviation which  has  taken place 
in  recent years have  made  it clear that although  the present 
regime  has  produced  an  extensive  network  of aviation 
services,  the rigidities of the  system  (mentioned  in  the 
first memorandum)  give  rise to an  increasing degree  of public 
dissatisfaction.  This  criticism  (not  all of which  is 
justified)  has  tended  to centre  on  the civil aviation 
services provided within Europe:  and  the  Commission  is 
confirmed  in its view that within the  Community  there is 
scope  for  introducing  more  flexibility  and  competition  into 
the  existing  system without destroying it or  losing  the 
benefits that it has  brought  about.  Flexibility is not, 
ho~ever,  an  end  in itself.  It should  be  regarded  rather as 
the  means  to  improving  the  services  to  the  consumer  and  the 
profitability of  the efficient and  enterprising airline. 
40.  One  strand of  the public debate has  been  the  argument  that it 
would  be  impossible  to adjust  the  intra-Community  system 
without  unacceptable  repercussions  on  the  world-wide 
international  system.  The  Commission  does  not  accept this 
argument.  It does,  however,  accept  that  a  system suitable  for 
application between  Member  States of  the  Community will not 
necessarily be  suitable  for  application  on  routes  to third 
countries.  It therefore proposes  to concentrate  on  the 
improvement  of  the  air transport  system within the  Community 
as  a  step towards  the  creation of  a  genuine  Community  ~arket 
in aviation  and  a  contribution to the  improvement  of the 
internal market  in its wider  sense. - 22  -
41.  The  Commission  equally realises that  even  changes  limited  in 
scope  in this way  may  have  some  repercussions  on  the  services 
provided by  the airlines of the  non-Community  states of 
Europe  and  in  formulating  its proposals has kept this aspect 
very  much  in mind. 
42.  In  formulating  the Community's  policy  towards  air transport, 
it is necessary  to bear  in mind  the  following  considerations: 
i.  all Member  States have airlines with  a  significant 
network  of  services:  many  of  them  are  owned,  financed 
or otherwise  supported by  their governments.  Most,  if 
not all,  Member  States would  regard it as  unthinkable 
that their airline should  go  out of business.  Some 
expect  the  airlines to operate particular routes  or  a 
route  system,  or to retain  redundant staff.  This  may  be 
important  for  overall  economic,  political or  social 
reasons  but it is not  always  compatible with  sound 
commercial  management  principles.  Many  Member  States are 
thus  reluctant to expose  their airlines to a  degree  of 
competition which  in their view  would  put these 
objectives at risk.  Equally,  many  of the  airlines 
operate at  a  loss,  and  did  so  even  before  the present 
recession,  and  the desire to avoid  any  increase  in these 
deficits  increases  the  reluctance  of  governments  to 
expose  their airlines to further  competition. 
ii.  Under  the  present  system of  inter-airline cornn1ercial 
agreements,  governmental bilateral treaties and 
arrangements,  and  bilateral governmental  control of 
airline services,  which  was  established after the war, 
an  extensive  route  network  and  high quality services 
have  developed.  This  system also  enable~ governments  to 
ensure  that their airlines do  not  suffer  from  the 
-operatfons-o£-competitors  to  a  degree  that they  consider 
unacceptable.  The  protection afforded  varies but at its 
most  comprehensive  in effect ensures that the traffic 
carried  and  the  revenue  earned  on  services  between - 23  -
Member  States  is divided equally between  their 
carriers.  It is thus  considered  normal  by  them  for  any 
advantage  which  an  airline obtains  (e.g.  by  the  use  of 
better equipment  or  as  a  result of better marketing) 
eventually to be  eliminated  by bilateral negotiations 
between  the  countries  concerned.  This  system of 
bilateral control has  over  the  years  developed  an 
increasing degree  of detail  and  sophistication. 
iii. The  present  system,  despite  some  criticism expressed of 
it,  does  contain within it a  limited degree  of 
competition.  Major  scheduled airlines have  always 
competed  on  service:  and  in particular the charter 
airlines  and  other  modes  of  tra~sport have  provided  a 
competitive  stimulus.On the other hand  the  ultimate 
protection afforded  by  the  possibilities of correcting 
commercial  failure  by  diplomatic  negotiations has  for 
long  periods  reduced  the  incentive of carriers to apply 
to their own  operations  the  sort of critical approach 
that undertakings  in  a  more  competitive  environment  are 
driven to.  The  current recession  (and  the  consequential 
demands  on  governments  for  increased  subsidies)  has 
caused airlines to  examine  their operations  more 
critically or has  at least  caused  some  governments  to 
demand  that they  should.  But  it is  likely that the 
effect of  the  recession would  have  been  less dramatic  if 
airlines had  been  subject to  a  steady  and  continuing 
commercial  pressure  to control their operations  and 
their costs.  It is also likely that  a  more  competitive 
environment  would  reduce  the  temptation  on  governments 
to expect their airlines to employ  more  staff than  they 
really need  and  to  use  types  of  aircraft which  are  not 
necessarily those  commercially  most  suitable. - 2 4-
iv.  The  Commission's  studies  show  that although  the  level of 
air fares  in Europe  is frequently criticised and 
compared  unfavourably with  those  in the u.s.  or  on  the 
North Atlantic,  they are  not  in  fact  in most  cases 
unreasonably  related to airline costs.  A  change  in the 
procedures  relating to the  fixing  of air fares  to 
encourage  experiment will  not  in itself produce  lower 
average  fares  but  may  produce  a  wider  range  of  fares  as 
experience  in  recent years  has  shown  in Europe.  A  change 
in these procedures  together with application of other 
competitive pressure  may  however  ultimately result  in 
cost adaptations  and  thereby produce  a  generally  lower 
level  of air  fares.  Recent  experience  in  Europe  with 
overcapacity has  shown  this to be  true.  It is therefore 
important  to consider  changes  in the  fare  fixing 
procedures  together with  changes  in other elements of 
the market  structure to ensure  that sufficient 
commercial  pressure  is created to ensure  that  the 
underlying  cost  structure of airlines is  changed. 
v.  The  airlines point out,  validly,  that there are 
significant cost  elements  (in particular  fuel,  ATC  and 
airport charges)  which  they  can  influence  very  little. 
A  study prepared by  consultants  for.  the  Commission 
estimates  the  proportion of costs which  are  manageable 
by  the airlines at about  40%.  The  table below  shows  how 
this result is arrived at.  The  figures  may  of  course  be 
open  to debate  but  the  Commission  is prepared  to accept 
them  as  giving  the order  of magnitude  of manageable 
airline costs. - 25  -
SCHEDULED  AIRLINE  COSTS 
WITHIN  EUROPE  AND  THEIR  SUSCEPTIBILITY  TO  MANAGEMENT  CONTROL 
Cockpit  Crew Salaries 
and  expenses 
Fuel  and  Oil 
Flight Equipment  Insurance 
Cockpit  Crew  Training 
Other  Flight Operations 
Expenses 
Maintenance  and  Overhaul 
- Materials 
- Burden 
- Staff 
% of 
total 
costs 
5.07 
19.85 
0.69 
0.53 
0.62 
1.24 
3.19 
3.31 
Flight Equipment  Depreciation 4.92 
Ground  Property  Depreciation  1.13 
Other  Depreciation 
Landing  charges 
Airport  Passenger  Charges 
En-Route  Navigation 
Aircraft and  Passenger 
Handling 
Airport Navigation 
Passenger  Catering 
Passenger  Insurance,Misc. 
Cabin  Crew Salaries 
and  Expenses 
Advertising  and  Public 
Relations  · 
Ticketing,  Sales  and 
Promotion  Staff 
Reservations 
General  and  Administrative 
Other  Operating  Costs 
0.25 
4.07 
5.15 
3.61 
12.22 
0.85 
4.02 
o.so 
3.57 
3.80 
14.62 
1.84 
4.47 
o.so 
100.00 
of which 
% 
manageable 
30 
5 
0 
30 
25 
15 
30 
30 
20 
20 
20 
0 
0 
0 
60 
0 
100 
0 
30 
80 
80 
40 
80 
25 
% of 
total costs 
manageable 
!.  52 
0.99 
o.oo 
0.16 
0.16 
0.19 
0.96 
0.99 
0.98 
0.23 
o.os 
o.oo 
o.oo 
o.oo 
7.33 
o.oo 
4.02 
o.oo 
i.o7 
3.04 
11.70 
0.74 
3. 58 
0.13 
37.84 
Souice--:--All.stair  Tucker  and  Transportation Analysis  International; 
Relationship between  scheduled airline costs and  fares  in 
Europe,January  1983. - u-
vi.  Of  the costs which  lie beyond  a,irline control,  the  high 
price of  fuel  will eventually lead,  and  is in  fact 
leading,  to the  development  of more  fuel-efficient 
engines  and  airframes.  On  this aspect market  pressures 
appear  to  be  working.  It is noted  that the  use  of  these 
new  technologies  also results  in the  manufacture  of 
aircraft generating  lower  noise  levels,  which  assists 
airlines to  comply with  the  noise  rules  in  force.  On  air 
navigation  and  airport charges it is  frequently  arg 1ed 
that  the airlines could  charge  lower  fares  if,  as  in the 
u.s.,  at least a  part of  their infrastructure costs  (in 
which  for  the purposes  of this  paper  both Air Traffic 
Control  and  airport  charges  are  included)  were 
transferred  to the  tax payer.  Airlines or their 
customers  should  (as  should  other  modes  of transport), 
in relation to normal  commercial  operations,  pay  the 
relevant  economic  cost of  the  facilities  they  use  and 
those  who  provide  such  services,  whether  they  be 
governments  or  other bodies,  should  make  a  reasonable 
return on  their investment.  Airports  and  ATC  should, 
therefore,  be  efficiently and  economically managed.  See 
further  paragraph  70. 
43.  It is  sometimes  claimed  that  the  Community  should  adopt  a 
similar policy of deregulation  for  intra-Community air 
transport  as  the u.s.  has  done  for  its domestic  market. 
Whatever  merits  this policy may  have  in u.s.  conditions  the 
Commission  considers  that  for  the  reasons  developed  above, 
there  is no  point  in adopting it in  the  European  context 
since  a  number  of  the  underlying  conditions  which  made 
deregulation possible  in the u.s.  do  not  exist in Europe. 
Thus,  in contrast  to the  situation in  the  Community,  the 
u.s.  is  a  large  unified  domestic  market  reserved to 
u.s.carriers;  it was  accepted policy to  end  governmental - 27  -
intervention  in the  market:  and  to accept the  social  and 
economic  effects of  such  a  policy.  Furthermore,  the u.s.  has 
20  major  carriers all operating on  a  commercial  basis  and  the 
u.s.  Government  can  take  a  relaxed  view  on  the  fate  of  any 
one  of  them.  The  issue  in realistic terms,  therefore,  is not 
whether  the  Community  should  deregulate air transport,  but 
whether  the  present  system can  be  made  sufficiently flexible 
so  as  to contain within  itself enough  pressures  to ensure 
that airlines  increase  their productivity  and  provide their 
services at the  lowest possible cost. 
44.  At  the heart of  the  problem lies the  question of 
competition.  In  terms  of  the  treaty,  this  means  in partiqular 
considering \vhether  the  degree  of airline co-ordination  and 
governmental  intervention which  may  be  inevitable  can  be  so 
organised that  a  fair  share of  the  resulting benefit  is 
passed  on  to the  consumer.  Any  action  taken  on  competition 
needs  to be  seen  in  the  context of  overall aviation 
objectives  and  be  complemented  by  other  measures  designed to 
support it and  in particular by  a  control  of state aids, 
since otherwise  there  is  a  serious  risk that  any  relaxation 
will  do  no  more  than  lead  to  a  subsidy  race  between  Member 
States.  Thus,  in  order  to develop  further  the  common  air 
transport policy,  the  main  guidelines  should  be  : 
a)  given  the  general  preference  for  an  evolutionary  approach 
to  the  common  air transport  policy,  the  Community  should 
seek  to  develop  Community  rules  on  how  the  existing  system 
should  be  operated  in relation to  intra-Community 
services; 
b)  it should  introduce  into the  system  sufficient flexibility 
and  competition to ensure  enough  pressure  on  airlines to 
control  costs,  increase productivity  and  provide  efficient 
and  attractively priced  services  to the  user:  and  to 
enable  the  efficient  and  enterprising airline to benefit: -- zs-.. -
c)  it should,  to the  extent possible,  -aim  to  reduce  the  costs 
'"hich  lie outside airlines  •  control1 
d)  it should  take  into account  public  service  requirements 
that  some  governments  make  of their airlines7 
e)  it should  have  at its base  the control of state aids  to 
the air transport sector. 
_f)  it should  not  endanger  the  maintenance  of high  levels of 
•  safety. 
g)  It should  take  into account  the  job prospects of those 
employed  in the  industry7 
h)  it should  include  action in the  field of  research. 
i)  it should  ensure,  to the greatest extent,  the  reduction of 
the  noise  exposure  levels  around airfields by  implementing 
technologically  feasible  and  economically  reasonable 
measures. 
ACTION  ON  COMPETITION 
45.  Competition between  international  scheduled airlines  in  the 
Community  is determined by  a  framework  which  governs  the 
operating conditions  of this  industry both at the  level  of 
the enterprises  and  at governmental  level.  In  most  cases 
competition is structured  : 
i)  on bilateral agreements  and  arrangements  between  Member 
States dealing  mainly with  the  scope  of traffic rights 
granted  to each other•s airlines,  and  also with 
questions  of capacity and  tariffs. - 29  -
ii)  on  the basis of  commercial  and  tariff agreements  between 
airlines which  determine  the  economic  aspects  of their 
operations. 
46.  The  Commission  considers  that  the main  measures  to be  taken 
are  the  follO\ving  : 
a)  Community  rules  on  certain points affecting the  content 
and  method  of  application of the bilateral agreements  and 
arrangements  which  Member  States conclude; 
b)  action  to  amend  the  machinery  for  the  settlement of · 
air tariffs; 
c)  action  to limit  the  effect of  commercial  and  tariff 
agreements  between airlines. 
In  proposing  the  changes  to existing practice which  are 
set out  in the  following  paragraphs,  the  Commision's 
objective  is to  introduce  a  significant  relaxation of  the 
present  system.  It considers  that if these  changes  are 
adopted  and  implemented  as  a  co-ordinated  package,  they 
will  lead  to more  competetive  services  and  thus  to  lower 
fares  for  the  consumer  without  endangering  the  benefits which 
the  existing  system has  so  far  produced.  It wishes  in 
particular to  remove  the  blocks  which  at present  inhibit 
innovative  and  competitive airlines  and  enable  both  them  and 
the  consumer  to benefit  from  such airlines'  enterprise.  The 
changes  that these  measures will  induce  should,  and  in  the 
Commission's  view will,  come  gradually  and  thus  give  the 
airlines  and  their employees  time  to adjust.  In  these 
circumstances  the  Commission  believes that,  when  linked to 
the changes  in  Governmental  procedures  referred  to at  (a)  and 
(b)  above,  an  exemption,  limited  in  time  and  subject to 
conditions,  of the  agreements  referred to at  (c)  above  would 
be  justified  under article 85(3). - 30  -
Action with  regard to the  content  and application of 
bilateral agreements  and  arrangements 
Capacity  and  revenue  sharing  rules 
47.  If the  system  is to be  made  more  responsive  to the 
requirements  of  the  market  place  the  regulatory  framework 
must  be  relaxed  in order  to allow more  room  for  the airlines 
to  comp~te.  It would  therefore  be  essential that Member 
States accept  : 
i)  that pooling  agreements  between airlines whether  of 
capacity or  revenues,  are not  made  a  condition of 
operations  under  the bilateral agreements: 
ii)  that they  should  not  insist on  a  rigid  50/50  share  of 
the  traffic  in  services  between  their country  and  other 
members  of the  Community.  At  the  same  time  the 
Commission  acknowledges  that  total market  domination  by 
one  side  would  not  be  acceptable  to most  Member  States 
and  takes  the  view  that the bilateral agreements  could, 
if Member  States wish,  contain  safeguards  against it. 
Thus,  Community  rules  should  provide  that  in  agreements 
and  arrangements  with  each other  Member  States  should 
not  seek  to  regulate capacity provided  in  such  a  way 
that  any  one  party is guaranteed  a  traffic share of more 
than  25%.  This  would  at the  same  time  permit  a  greater 
degree  of  competition  and  assure  a  ~1ember State that its 
airline would  have  as  a  safety net  a  level  of operation 
belo\v  which  it could  not  fall without  the  consent  of 
its own  government. 
At  Annex  I  is  a  draft Decision  designed  to give  effect to 
this  proposal. - 31  -
Modification of the  1981  air tariff proposal 
48.  The  Commission's  proposal  (1)  has  been  the  subject of 
considerable debate  in the  Community's  institutions  and 
elsewhere.  The  Commission  thinks it should  amend  its original 
proposal  to take  account  of their discussions,  and  in 
particular of the  opinions of the  Economic  and  Social 
Co~,ittee and  the  European  Parliament.The  revised proposal 
should  in its view also reflect  such  recent  developments  in 
the  economic  and  regulatory  environment  as  the  agreements 
between  the u.s.  and  certain E.C.A.c.  states on  the 
establishment of  a  number  of  reference tariffs,  and  for  zones 
of reasonableness  i.e.  a  pricing  range within which  the 
airlines  can  establish their tariffs freely without  seeking 
government  approval.  This  concept  ~as also been  examined  by 
E.C.A.C.  in its report  on  competition  in intra European air 
services  (2).  It seems  to  the  Commission  that this  concept 
has  considerable merit  in  the  Community  context. 
49.  The  amendments  proposed  by  the  Commission  are at Annex  II. 
The  proposal  as  amended  would  leave airlines  and  governments 
free  to decide what  type  of  fares  the  one  should  propose  and 
the other approve.  It accepts  that airlines  should  be  as  free 
as possible to decide  what  sort of tariff suits their 
commercial  needs;  and  is  encouraged  by  the  fact  that  the 
airlines are actively considering whether  and  in what  form 
zones  of  flexibility might  be  used  in  Europe.  The  Commission 
noted  the  reluctance  on  the part of  the  Parliament  and  the 
Council  to establish  an  arbitration procedure  as  originally 
proposed.  On  the other hand  the  .. Commission  also noted  that 
the  procedure  in  the  1967  convention has  not  been  used  to 
resolve  problems  which  have  arisen.  The  Commission  therefore 
proposes  a  procedure  which  obviates  the  need  for 
arbitration.The  proposal  varies  the  degree  of  governmental 
(1 )  OJ  No  C  7 8,  3 0 • 3 • 19  8 2 ,  p.  6 
(2)  European Civil Aviation Conference  (E.C.A.C.),  Report  on 
competition  in  Intra-European Air  Services,  Paris  1982. - 32  -
control  in  accordance  with  the  flexibility permitted to 
individual airlines.  Airline pricing would  be  subject to 
double  approval  i.e.  by  both Governments  if it included  zones 
of flexibility with  a  minimum  percentage  range.  Within  the 
zones  the  fares  would  be  free,  or  subject  to double 
disapproval  or  to country of origin approval  at the  choice  of 
the  states concerned.  If the  fare  proposal  was  _an  individual 
air fare  and  a  dispute  arose  between  governments,  the 
governments  would  be  expected  to consult  each other  and  seek 
an  agreement.  If this proved  impossible,  in the  end  the 
country of origin would  be  permitted  to go  ahead  unless  the 
country of destination accepted  two  zones  of flexibility  for 
the  route  in  question.  The  proposal  thus  seeks  to ensure  in  a 
much  more  direct way  than  through  arbitration that the  system 
of  governmental  approval  (which will be  reflected by  the 
proposal  made  later in  this  paper  on  the  system at the 
commercial  level)  gives  adequate  scope  for  the  introduction 
by airlines of  innovative  and  enterprising  fare  policies. 
The  proposal  also  encourages  a  more  direct contact with  user 
representatives. 
Action with  regard  to agreements  between airlines 
50.  Agreements  between  airlines determine  the  operational 
modalities  of  their commercial  co-operation.  Their  main 
features  are  scheduling  agreements  (1),  capacity  and  revenue 
sharing  in  varying  degrees  and  tariff agreements,  ~~ether 
multilateral or bilateral. 
51.  These  are  agreements  between  airlines with  the  object of 
fixing  the  numbers  of  seats offered by  them,  very often  on  a 
50/50 basis.  Such  agreements  have  certain merits  in that  they 
help  to ensure  a  spread of services  in  the  less  busy  periods 
and  in  some  cases  on  the  less busy  routes.  On  the other hand 
(l)  This  paper  does  not  consider  scheduling  agreements  further. 
An  exception is already  included  in the  present proposal  for  a 
competition  regulation. - 33  -
they  can  result in rather  uniform market  features  as  regards 
the  type  of aircraft and  the  services offered to the 
customer;  and  they  tend  to disadvantage  the  more  efficient 
airlines.  In  the  Commission's  view  taking  into account  the 
consideration set out  in paragraph  46  capacity sharing 
agreements  between airlines  (or equivalent  arrangements) 
should  be  permissible  though  not  obligatory,  provided that 
any  party  may  withdraw  from  such  an  agreement  on  giving  a 
reasonably short  period of notice. 
52.  Agreements  between airlines usually contain  clauses  on 
revenue  sharing  aimed at equalising  (open  pools)  or  almost 
equalising  {limited pools)  the  revenue  of the  pool  partners. 
Joint operations  are special  forms  of pooling  (para.55). 
53.  It is obvious  that pooling  agreements  can  be  used  as  an 
effective instrument  to restrict whatever  competition might 
otherwise  have  taken place.  In  this respect  pool  agreements 
would  be  contrary to article 85.1.  On  the  other hand  revenue 
pools  may  provide  an  incentive to operate outside  the 
profitable periods  and  thus  improve  the  service  to  the 
consumer. 
54.  This  leads  the  Commission  to the  view  that  revenue  pools 
should  be  permitted if they  meet  certain criteria.  The 
Commission  is quite clear  that open  pools  which  simply 
distribute  the  revenue  between  the  two  airlines,  on  the  basis 
of  the  capacity offered,  cannot  be  exempted  under article 
85.3.  There  must  be  a  limitation on  the  level of  revenue 
sharing which  can  result  from  a  pool  agreement.  These 
limitations  must  be  based  on  the possibilities of  exemption 
which  are  open  under article 85.3.  The  revenue  sharing 
resulting  from  a  pool  agreement  must  therefore  be  clearly 
related to the  improvement  in air transport  service  resulting 
from  the  agreement:  it must  represent  the  give  and  take of - 34  -
schedule  compromises  with  the  minimum  anti-competitive 
effect.  ?he  improvements  may  be  with  respect  to the  service 
itself or  to the  cost effectiveness of  the  service.  From  the 
investigations it has  made  the  Commission  is prepared to 
accept  that  a  pool  which  limits  the  transfer of  revenue  from 
one airline to the other to  1%  of the  poolable  revenue  would 
qualify  for  a  group  exemption  under article 85.3.  All other 
revenue  sharing  agreements  exceeding  that ceiling would  be 
subject  to  specific  scrutiny  in each  case  in order to 
determine whether  they  would  qualify for  exemption  under 
article 85.3. 
55.  There  are  cases where  a  single airline operates  on  a  route, 
or  a  route  system,  on  the  basis of  a  joint cost  and  revenue 
sharing  agreement  with its counterpart.  In  some  cases  these 
agreements  allocate one  route  to one  airline and  one  to 
the  other,  both  being  operated  in their  joint interest. 
l~ether or  not  such  agreements  comprise  a  serious restriction 
of  competition will  depend  on  the  circumstances  prevailing. 
For  this  reason  the  Commission  is clear that  such  agreements 
cannot  benefit  from  a  group  exemption  because  competition is 
deliberately excluded  from  the  route.  However,  there might  be 
a  case  for  an  individual  exemption where  only  a  single 
airline could  operate  economically both  from  the  point of 
view  of  the airline  and  the  consumer  or where,  for  example, 
it was  necessary  to facilitate  shuttle services  or other 
innovative  services which  clearly benefit the  consumer. 
56.  The  responses  given  by  the  Member  States  to  the  Commission's 
inquiries  on  responsibility  for tariff negotiations  and 
agreements  do  not  g~v~  ~  ~~~~~~cu~Rictu~e. It seems  that-~­
exact role of airline and  government  varies with  the state 
concerned  and  that responsibility  is  in  varying  degrees 
shared  between  them.  Certain aspects of tariff fixing,  as at 
present practised,  may  be  contrary to articles 85  and  90. - 35  -
57.  Most  Member  States of  the  Community  as  well  as  a  large 
majority of  ICAO  Member  States regard tariff consultations 
between airlines as  an  essential  elemen~ in their air 
transport policy and  they often•expect their airlines to 
conduct  such consultations  subject to government  approval. 
Undoubtedly,  tariff consultations between airlines restrict 
competition  and  result  in  an  economic  advantage  to the air 
carriers.  But  on  the other hand  the  system has  allowed  the 
provision of  reliable,  high quality services  to the 
consumer.  For  the  reasons  set out in paragraph  46  the 
Commission  is .inclined  to accept  such  consultations  provided 
they  also confer  an  equivalent advantage  to the  consumer, 
that  they  are  not  unduly  restrictive and  that  a  reasonable 
degree  of competition is ensured. 
58.  With  this  in  mind  the  Commission  considers  that conditions 
for  granting  a  group  exemption to tariff consultations 
would  be  met  if  : 
i)  airlines had  an  effective right of  independent action, 
both  in  terms  of  proposing tariffs  independently of 
other airlines,  and  in  terms  of  freedom  to  implement 
such  tariffs,  subject only to the  limited  government 
control  described  in paragraphs  48  to 49. 
ii)  The  Member  States  concerned  and  the  Commission  were 
enabled  to participate as  observers  in tariff 
consultations. 
59.  The  Commission  takes  the  view  that given  the  circumstances  of 
the  situation that  a  more  competitive  regime  is desirable but 
that airlines  should  have  a  period  in which  to adjust,  it 
would  be wise  to  limit  the  intended  group  exemptions  to  7 
years  and  review  them at  the  end  of  that period. - 36  -
60.  Annex  III  A  is an  amendment  to the draft Council  Regulation 
laying  down  the  procedure  for  the  rules  on  competition 
applying  to undertakings  in the air transport  sector, 
transmitted to the  Council  on  18  November  1982.  It limits  the 
scope  of  the  Regulation  to international  air  transport 
between  Community  airports.  Annex  III  B  sets out  a  proposed 
Council  Regulation  empowering  the  Commission  to grant  group 
exemptior_s  in certain cases.  Annex  III  C  contains  the 
essentials of  a  Commission  Regulation  granting  such  group 
exemptions  in pursuance  of the Council's  enabling  power. 
Annexes  III  B  and  C  have  been drafted  in  the  light of  the 
Commission's  present knowledge  of  the  commercial  agreements 
actually  in  force.  The  Commission  reserves  the  right to open 
proceedings  for  infringement of the  T~eaty against  those 
Member  States which  have  not  adequately  replied to its 
request  for  information. 
ACTION  ON  STATE  AIDS 
I 
61.  The  Commission  is aware  that the  relaxation  in  the  existing 
regulatory  system  sketched  out  in  the  previous  chapters will 
not work  without  taking  state aids  into consideration.  The 
responsibility  for  implementing  art.  92  and  93  of  the  Treaty 
concerning  state aids  lies with  the  Commission.  It is clear, 
that  unless  the  state aids  rules  are  adequately  applied  any 
increase  in  competition between airlines  could  result in the 
financing  of  such  competition  out  of  state aid;  in  short  a 
subsidy  race.  This  is manifestly  undesirable. - 37  -
62.  In order to clarify its intentions  in this matter  for  the 
Member  States  and  the civil aviation sector  the  Commission 
has  prepared  the  attached  document  (Annex  IV)  which 
establishes guidelines  in this area.  The  following  is a 
summary  of  the  main  considerations to which  the  Commission 
will have  regard. 
a)  Member  States  must  respect  their obligations  under 
article 93.3  to notify all proposed  state aids  or 
alterations thereto in  advance,  so  as  to enable  the 
Commission  to take  a  position on  them.  The  aids must 
be  transparent  in  the  sense  that their effects  can  be 
controlled.  The  Commission will  prevent  the granting 
of state aids  from  resulting  in  a  transfer of  the 
difficulties of the enterprise of  one  Member  State to 
those  of other  Member  States of  the  Community. 
b)  The  Commission  considers  that,  despite  recent 
difficulties,  the  Community's air transport  sector 
should  normally  be  capable.of  coping  with market 
forces.  The  Commission,  therefore,  believes that 
article 92,  should be  applied to civil aviation  in the 
same  way,  mutatis  mutandis,  as  to other  economic 
sectors.  Some  Member  States  consider that certain aids 
compensate  for  the  imposition of  a  public  service 
obligation on  their airlines.  The  Commission  considers 
that the possibilities  under  the Treaty  and  in 
particular article 92.3  provide  sufficient flexibility 
to handle  the  specific cases  of  which it has  knowledge 
or  which  may  be  notified  in  the  future.  However,  it 
will keep  this  subject  under  review.  In addition,  the 
Commission  ,  in considering  individual  state aid 
cases,  take  into account  whether  undertakings  fall 
within the  scope  of article 90.2. 
c)  The  Commission  in its application of the state aid 
rules will  give  primary attention to the 
intracommunity  aspects.  It will operate  these  rules 
in  such  a  manner  as  not  to put  Community  carriers at 
a  competitive disadvantage with carriers  from  third 
countries,  who  are  either  subsidised or otherwise 
benefit  from  preferential  treatment. - 38  -
d)  The  provision of capital,  loans  or of guarantees  by  a 
Government  to  an airline which it owns  may  constitute 
either an  aid,  a  normal  commercial  transaction between  the 
owner  of  an  enterprise  and  that entreprise or  a  mixture  of 
the  two.  Therefore it has  to be  determined  in particular 
cases if there is an  aid  element  and  if so whether it is 
justifiable. 
e)  The  Commission  can  only authorise aids where  there  is a 
compensatory  justification in  terms  of  the  common 
interest.  Aids  whose  main  purpose  is to  cover  an  airline's 
operating  loss would  not  normally be  considered  as  being 
compatible with  the  common  market.  However,  in cases where 
the  financial  situation of  an  airline  company  is 
particularly precarious but where  real possiblities  for 
improvement  exist the  Commission  could authorise  the  aids 
required  for  recovery of the  enterprise  provided  that 
these  interventions were  an  integral part of  a  programme 
containing  adequate  measures  for  restoring the  financial 
viability and  competitiveness  of  the  enterprise within  a 
reasonable  time  period. 
f)  Subject to  the  facts  of particular cases,  aids  to assist 
air services  in  economically  under-developped  regions of 
the  Community  would  be  acceptable,  provided  the 
difficulties of  the  region were  assessed  in  a  national  and 
Community  context. 
g)  The  Commission will,  in general,  tend  to accept  aids which 
are  provided  to  facilitate the  operation of domestic 
routes.  In particular,  the Commission  considers  that aid 
granted to purely domestic  airlines,  which  do  not have  any 
direct or indirect  links with  international airlines is 
unlikely to  fall within the  terms  of-article  92  et seq.  of 
the Treaty.  Nevertheless  such  aids  would  be  incompatible 
with  the  common  market  if they  had  the effect of diverting 
significant volumes  of  international traffic into the 
Member  State  in question or  of  allowing  carriers to 
cross-subsidize  their international operations. (4) 
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h)  Aid  provided  to airlines to  encourage  the purchase  and 
operation of  specific aircraft would  not  be  considered  as 
conferring  a  benefit on  the airline,  provided  such  an  aid 
merely  covered  the  additional  costs  to the airline of 
purchasing  and  operating  an  aircraft other  than  the 
optimum  from  its commercial  viewpoint,  but  as  an  indirect 
aid  to the  manufacturer,  and  would  be  assessed  as  such. 
Consideration by  the Commission  of Existing Aids 
63.  All  the  Hember  States have  supplied  information to the 
Commission  on  the State aids  granted by  them  and/or  on  their 
financial  relations with  airlines.  The  Commission  is 
therefore  in  a  position to  review,  in  cooperation with  each 
Member  State,  under  the  provision of article 93.1.  the  system 
of aid existing in  the  Member  States,  which  were  not  notified 
in  advance  to it.  If,  as  a  result of  this  examination,  it 
concludes  that action  should  be  taken  on  certain aids,  it 
will  ensure  that the different  t-1ember  States are  treated 
equitably. 
Legislation on  state aids 
64.  The  commission  is considering  the  extension  of its· 
transparency directive  (1)  at  an  appropriate  time.  It would 
use  the opportunity of  such  an  extension  to  apply  its 
provisions  also  to air transport. 
(1)  Commission  directive  80/723/EEC  of  25  June  1980  on  the 
transparency of  financial  relations between  Member  States  and 
public  undertakings  in  OJ  L  195,  29.7.1980,  p.  35. - 40  -
Implementation 
65.  The  measures  advocated  in paras.47-49  and  61-64  apply  to the 
activities of  governments  and  those  advocated  in  paras  50-60 
apply to the airlines as  the  commercial  operators.The 
resulting  Community  action  stems  either  from  provisions of 
the Treaty that give direct powers  to the  Commission,  and  are 
directly applicable,  such  as  articles 89,  90,  92  and  93,  or 
it stems  from  articles 94.2  and  87  which  require  action  by 
the  Council.  The  various  elements  of  the policy advocated 
above  for  airline and  government activities obviously 
interact on  each other  and  should  be  regarded  as  a  whole. 
They  should  therefore,  in the Commission's  view,  be  enacted 
in parallel. 
66.  The  Commission  realises  that these  ideas,  although  in its 
view  reasonable  and  moderate,  will  require  time  for 
discussion  and  acceptance.  This  period  should  not  be  too  long 
and  it preserves  the  freedom  to initiate direct action on  the 
· basis of articles 99  and/or article  90  against particular 
commercial  and  tariff agreements  between  airlines,which 
infringe article 05,  and  against  any  practices which 
constitute  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  under article 86 
without waiting  for  the  adoption  of  the  legislation described 
above.  It will  proceed  on  its own  responsibility to the 
examination of  individual cases of state aids to airline 
companies  in accordance with  the principles set out  in this 
paper. 
MEASURES  DESIGNED  TO  REDUCE  AIRLINE  COSTS 
Infrastructure 
67.  The  Commission  has  recently received  the  results of  a  study 
on  capacity constraints  for air transport  in the  Community. 
The· study covered  tne-capacfiy- with r-e-spect to airports  and 
air traffic control.  It concluded  that there were  serious - 41  -
inadequacies  in  the air route  system,  in particular countries 
or  locations  in Europe.  Constraints resulted  from  physical 
organizational,  procedural  and political difficulties at 
local,  national  and  international  levels within and  between 
the  components  of  the  industry  and  their operating agencies. 
The  Report  found  significant shortcomings  in  the present Air 
Traffic Control  (ATC)  system but  concluded  that air carriers 
and  a~rport operators are  also partly responsible.  Airport 
congestion,  affecting  carriers  and  consumers,  was  identified 
as  an  important  problem  for  major  airports.  Furthermore, 
airlines  complain  about  the  level of charges  made  for  the 
use  of airports  and  the  present  system of slot allocation at 
peak  periods  may  lead  to  a  misallocation of  resources. 
68.  In deciding  the  role  of  the  Community  in this area it is 
necessary  to bear  in  mind  the  existing  national or 
international  arrangements:  it would  serve  no  useful  purpose 
if the  Community  were  to duplicate  the  work  of bodies  that 
already  existed.  ATC  is covered  by  the  subordinate  regional 
bodies  of  ICAO  and  Eurocontrol. 
69.  It is not  the  intention of  the  Commission  to  involve  itself 
directly in questions  of  ATC  or airport  investment  and 
management.  Given,  however,  the  pressures  which  the 
proposals  contained  in this  document  will  place  on airlines, 
the  Commission  thinks it reasonable  to  seek  to ensure, 
insofar  as  it can,  that the  infrastructural  services  on  which 
the airlines have  to rely,  but  in the  operation of which  they 
themselves  have  very  little influence,  are efficiently 
provided.  To  this  end,  it proposes  : 
a)  to  study  the  ATC  problem  and  publish  the  results  and  to 
draw  the attention of  the national authorities  to any 
deficiencies of  the  system which  in its view  unreasonably 
handicap  the  airlines:  and  press  for  removal  of  such 
deficiencies: - 42  -
b)  to study,  in consultation with all  interested parties,  the 
possibility of evolving efficiency criteria for  airports 
which will  enable  a  judgement  to  be  made  on  their relative 
efficiency;  it is not  clear to  the  Commission  whether 
efficiency criteria can  be  evolved  relating to  ATC 
services but it will  consider with  Member  States whether 
it can  be  done. 
70.  The  Commission will  in due  course  develop  a  proposal  for  the 
Council  on  the  implementation  of  common  principles  for  user 
charges  at major  airports which will  take  into account 
(mutatis mutandis)  those  currently being  evolved  for  surface 
transport. 
Facilitation of air freight  transport 
71.  To  compete  in the  freight  market air transport has  to 
emphasize  its primary characteristic of  speed.  It is 
important  that this  advantage  is not  negated  by  slow  and 
cumbersome  procedures  on  the  ground.  The  Commission  will 
present  in  1984  a  report  concerning  the  existing difficulties 
for  intracownunity air  freight.  It is  already emerging  from 
the  study  that the  causes  of  certain problems  can  be  found, 
for  example,  in  time-consuming  procedures  for  cross-border 
purposes,  handling  procedures,  communication  between 
airlines,  shippers,  freight  forwarders  and  customs  services 
(etc.).  These difficulties seriously  inhibit the  development 
of  intra-community air cargo  services. - 43  -
72.  Some  of the  problems will  be  solved  through  the Council's 
recent directive,  "on  the  facilitation of physical 
inspections  and  administrative  formalities  in  respect of the 
carriage of  goods  between  Member  States"  (1)  but it will be 
necessary to act  in other areas  also,  be  that at Community, 
national  or airline level.  The  Commission  intends  to  submit 
an  appropriate  proposal  to the  Council  in  1904. 
OTHER  MEASURES 
Access  to the  market 
73.  As  has  been  stated earlier in this paper  the civil aviation 
industry  in  the  Community  is dominated  by  the  large, 
nationally owned  or  controlled airl.ines.  In  some  t·1ember 
States  there  is  the policy  (sometimes  embodied ·in 
legislation)  that  the  national airline should  have  a  monopoly 
of  scheduled  services.  In  most  ~'Jember  States other airlines 
exist,  but  they  tend  to  be  limited  in  their operations by  the 
preference  given  by  the  state to the  national  airline. 
74.  It seems  to  the  Commission  that.the civil aviation  industry 
would  be  given  a  stimulus  and  the  services  provided  to the 
consumer  improved  if it were  easier  for  smaller airlines to 
operate  scheduled  services.  In  many  bilateral agreements 
between  f-1ember  States  there  are  rights  to operate  routes 
~1ich are  not  at present being  utilised.  Many  of  these will 
be  thin  and  capable  of being profitably operated  only by 
airlines with  small  aircraft which  are better adapted  to 
these  routes.  In  the  Commission's  view it may  be  possible to 
stimulate  the  development  of  such airlines without 
significant damage  to the  major  airlines if Community  rules 
provided  that,  where  unused  rights  exist  in bilaterals,  any 
(1)  OJ  No  L  359,  22.12.1983,  p.  8 - 44  -
airline of either of the  two  states  involved  should  be 
allowed  by  its home  state to operate without  the  necessity of 
a  detailed  justification or. the  insistence on  a  reciprocal 
operation.  Such  an obligation could,  however,  if a  Member 
State  so desired,  be  made  subject to the offer of first 
refusal  to the  route of its own  national airlines.  The 
Commission  understands  that  a  system similar to this  is being 
operated with  success within  Scandinavia and  considers  that 
mutatis mutandis it could with benefit be  adopted  on 
international  routes between  Member  States of  the  Community. 
This  would  in itself be  a  relatively minor  innovation but it 
would  serve  as  a  useful  complement  to the  more  important 
changes  suggested  elsewhere  in this paper  and  respond  to the 
suggestions  expressed by  the  European  Parliament  in its 
resolution on  restrictions of competition  in the air 
transport sector  (1).  In order to put this  innovation  into 
practice  f.iember  States  should  generalize  in their bilaterals 
the possibility of designating  more  than  one  national airline 
for  the operation of  intracommunity  services. 
75.  Another  possibility,  which  might  complement,  or  possibly 
replace  the  idea  in  the  previous  paragraph  would  be  to 
abandon  any  restrictions  (subject of course  to the  usual 
safety and  fitness  regulations),  on  services  run  by  any 
Community  operator  on  routes  between  1'-lember  States of  the 
Community  with aircraft containing  no  more  than,  say,  25 
seats.  Such  services  would  have  no  significant  impact  on  the 
services  run  by  the  major  operators,  would  tend  to  stimulate 
aviation activity and  thus  employment  in  the  industry  and 
would  encourage  the  development  of thin  routes  to  and  from 
areas  which  have  few  if any air connections. 
------------------- _  .. ____________________ ----
(1)  OJ  No  C  291,  10.11.1980,  p.  60 - 45  -
Non-scheduled  services 
76.  Since  the distinction between  scheduled  and  non-scheduled 
services was  first made,  in the  Chicago  Convention,  the.scope 
and  nature of non-scheduled  services has  expanded  to  such  an 
extent that over half of air transport  (in passenger-km) 
within  Europe  is carried out  on  non-scheduled  services.  The 
prices charged  are  in most  cases  uncontrolled  and  the market 
is highly competitive.  The  market  is primarily bilaterally 
organised  (e.g.  only the  German  and  Italian charter companies 
participate in the  non-scheduled traffic between  Germany  and 
Italy)  but  the  services  are  not  normally  covered  in the 
bilateral agreements  in  the  way  that  scheduled  services are. 
Most  of  the traffic is  inclusive  tour traffic,  mainly 
originating in  the  UK,  Germany,  Benelux  and  Scandinavia.  In 
all these markets  the airlines of the  receiving  states are 
free  to bid  for  the business  on  the  same  terms  as  the 
airlines of  the originating states. 
77.  The  conditions  subject  to which  non-scheduled  traffic  may  be 
carried out vary  from  Member  State  to  Member  State  and  they 
sometimes  differ  from  tr.ose  imposed  by  the  receiving state. 
The  conditions  themselves  are  designed  to avoid  undermining 
the  scheduled  services which  Member  States  (for political, 
social or  other  reasons)  wish  to maintain. 
78.  In  the  Commission's  view  non-scheduled  services  are  an 
important  competitive  element  in  the  total air transport 
system which  to  some  extent acts  as  a  control  on  and  a 
stimulus  to  the  services provided  and  fares  charged  on 
scheduled  services.  Those  airlines operating  in  the  market 
are  enterprising  and  they  frequently  modify  the  services 
offered  (destinations,  frequencies,  etc.)  in  response  to  a 
demand  which  is met  and  sometimes  created by  them. - 46  -
79.  It would  be  ideal  to have  uniform rules  applicable  in both 
countries of origin and  destination of the  services  and 
uniform  rules  in the  Community  for  the  operation of 
non-scheduled  services.  The  Commission  fears  however  that  any 
attempt  to produce  such  criteria for  the  operation of 
non-scheduled  services would  tend  to rigidify  the  system;  and 
therefore  limits its proposals  to  two  main  changes. 
80.  There  are  many  places,  particularly in holiday areas,  which 
are  not  directly served  by  scheduled  services.  There  are 
equally other places where  scheduled  and  non-scheduled 
services co-exist and  where  the  competition between  them  is 
regulated  by  the conditions  imposed  by  the  Member  States.  In 
all these  cases,  the  Commission  considers it reasonable  that 
a  small  percentage  (such  as  15%)  of  the  seats available  on 
non-scheduled  services  should  be  available  for  sale on  a 
"seat only"  basis.  In  the  former  case,  it would  cater  for 
those  who  do  not  want  to buy  the  inclusive  tour ticket  and 
would  eliminate  the  "throw  away"  hotel  reservation,  and  on 
other  routes  would  introduce  an  element  of  competition with 
the  scheduled  services which  would  serve  as  a  control  on  and 
a  comparison  with  the  fares  charged  on  the  normal  scheduled 
services  .At  the  same  time  the  low percentage  of  such  seats 
offered  and  the  control  which  Member  States would  continue  to 
exercise  over  these  services  would  ensure  that  the basic 
system of  scheduled  services  which  Member  States,  at  least at 
present,  wish  to preserve  is  not  endangered. 
81.  The  second  change  concerns  the  carriage of  cargo  and  mail.  At 
present non-scheduled  passenger  services  are  generally not 
allowed  to carry  cargo  and  mail.  The  Commission  has  received 
conflicting  indications of  \'lhether  the  operators of 
non-scheduled  services  are  in  fact  interested  in carrying 
it.  It seems  to  the  Commission,  however,  that  once  a 
non-scheduled  service has  been  authorised,  it should  be 
allowed  to operate  in  an  as  efficient  and  cost-effective way 
as  possible  and  that  non-scheduled  services  should  not  be 
prevented  from  bidding  for  this business. - 47  -
82.  The  Commission will  make  proposals  designed  to bring about 
these  changes  which were  also  recommended  by the  European 
Parliament  in its resolution  on  restrictions of  competition 
in  the air transport sector  (1).  They will  apply  to countries 
both of origin  and  destination within the  Community.  The 
Commission will keep  developments  in this area,  in particular 
with  regard  to  the  organisation of  the market  and  competition 
under  review. 
Social matters 
83.  Social questions  in air transport  should as  in other  sectors 
of  the  economy  in the  first place  be  resolved within  the 
broader approach  on  social policy of the  Community.  In 
addition  to these  broader  considerations,  there  may  also  be 
specific problems  for  the air transport sector,  as  mentioned 
in the priority list of the  Council  of 1978.  These  could  be 
dealt with  through  legislation specific to air transport  and 
based  on  article 84,  par.  2.Possible  social  consequences  of 
Community  legislation  in air transport must  naturally also  be 
discussed with  both  sides of  the  industry,  as  was  also 
emphasized  by  the  European  Parliament  (2).  The  Commission 
will  examine  in  more  detail  institutional aspects  suitable  in 
this  respect. 
84.  Civil  aviation  inside  the  Community  provides  some  300.000 
jobs directly and  probably  another  200.000  indirectly.  It is 
extremely difficult to quantify  the  impact  of  the  suggested 
initiatives on  these  figures.  In  the  Commission's  opinion  any 
changes  induced will  be  gradual.  These  should  result in 
greater productivity  in  the airlines but  they  should  also 
stimulate activity by  opening  up  opportunities  for  carriers 
and  thus  in total have  a  long-term positive effect  on 
employment. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  291,  10.11.1980,  p.  60. 
(2)  OJ  No  C  291,  10.11.1980,  p.  65. - 48  -
85.  One  area  the  Commission  nas  for  some  time  examined  is the 
mutual  recognition  of licences.  It seems  sensible within  the 
Community  that certain  licences  issued  in one  Member  State as 
well  as  training and  qualifications obtained  should  be 
recognised  by  the others:  this will  enhance  job prospects of 
airline employees  affected  and  will  give  effect to  the  Treaty 
provisions  concerning  the  free  movement  of persons. 
86.  Concerni~g the  working  conditions,  the  Commission  has  ordered 
a  study on  national  regulations  concerning  flight  time 
limitations of  flying  staff.  It is very often claimed  that 
the  rules  imposed  by  some  countries  are  too  lax  and  that 
certain airlines are cutting their costs by  exploiting staff 
beyond  safe  levels.  On  the basis  of  the  results of this 
study,  the  Commission will  consider whether  any  action is 
necessary  in  this area. 
Research 
87.  As  in  inland  transport  the  Commission  is working,  on  the 
basis of  the objectives of  the  Commission's  broader  research 
programme  for  the  development  of  modern  technologies,  on 
research  proposals  for  new  or  improved  technologies.  Its  aim 
will  be  to complement  the  research  that already takes  place 
rather  than  to  seek  to duplicate  research  done  or  likely to 
be  done  elsewhere.  The  Commission  is developing  a  research 
programme  for air transport which will  be  submitted  to the 
Council  for  approval  in  1984. 
Aircraft noise 
88.  The  policy  in  this area,  is  undertaken within  the  general 
requirements  of  the  Treaty of  Rome,  the  aims  of which  include 
the  protection  and  improvement  of  the  environment  and  are  to 
ensure  that there  is  no  distortion of trade,  economic 
distortions  or  technical  barriers to trade within  the 
Corranuni ty.  Aspec_ts. oJ:.  the  first _t:.•,~Q- g.~_i;._j,on  programmes  on  the 
environment  (1}  are  emphasized  in  the  third action  programme 
(2)  which  reaffirms  the  aim  of promoting  the  use  of quieter 
(1)  OJ  Uo  C  112,  20.12.1973  -OJ  No  C  139,  13.6.1977 
(2)  OJ  No  C  46,  17.2.1983,  p.  1. - 49  -
aircraft and  stipulates that greater consideration is to be 
given to the  socio-economic  consequences  of any  measures  that 
are adopted.  The  Commission will continue to take into 
account  the  agreements  reached  in  ICAO,  ECAC  or  ISO 
organizations,  and  to  use  to the  greatest extent possible  the 
results of international  research,  for determining  i t.s 
actions  in the  field of aircraft nuisance  in  the  environment. 
General  aviation 
89.  According  to Annex  6  to the  Chicago Convention,  general 
aviation is defined as  :  "all civil aviation operations other 
than  scheduled air services and  non  scheduled air transport 
operations  for  remuneration or hire".It constitutes  a  market 
which  cannot  be  ignored.  Its influence  on  other sectors of 
the  economy  is felt  indirectly by  gains  in productivity, 
etc.  which  assist in the  development  of these  sectors. 
Community  action could be  beneficial to general aviation in 
three  areas,  personnel,  aircraft and  customs  formalities 
i)  as  regards  personnel,  the  Commission  is presently 
considering  taking  action  in connection with  the  mutual 
recognition of  licences  (see para.  85). 
ii)  concerning  aircraft,  the  Commission  notes  that the 
criteria and  equipment  required  for  obtaining  a 
certificate of airworthiness  for  an  imported aircraft 
vary  from  state to state:  this causes  relatively 
significant costs  for  the  buyers  of  second-hand aircraft 
and  may  constitute therefore  a  restriction on  trade 
between  Member  States.  A  mutual  recognition of 
certificates of airworthiness  for  aircraft weighing  less 
than  5.700  kg.  would  permit  an  alleviation of this 
obstacle and  the  Commission will  open  discussions  with 
interested parties about it. 
iii)  in the area of customs  formalities,  it should  be  noted 
that,  contrary to the current practice  in  surface - so  -
transport,  general  aviation users  are  submitted to 
complete  customs  formalities both  on  departure  and 
arrival.  This  forces  them  very  frequently  to undertake 
detours  and  intermediate  landings  which  are  expensive  in 
time  and  operating costs.  A  Community  action  allowing 
controls  to be  limited to either the airport of 
departure or arrival would  give  tangible  evidence  of 
European  integration  and  the  Commission will  consider 
whether  action  in this area  is necessary. 
INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 
90.  Although  the  Commission  proposals  are  restricted to air 
transport  between  Menmer  States of the  Community,  there  may 
obviously be  some  repercussions  for  other countries,  and  in 
particular for  neighbouring  European  countries  who  are 
members  of  ECAC.  Member  States will  have  an  obligation  under 
article  234  to take appropriate  steps  to eliminate provisions 
in agreements  with  third countries  which  are  incompatible 
with  the  regime  which  is eventually agreed  for  the 
Community.  The  Commission  accepts,  however,  that  these third 
countries will have  their  own  priorities,  that  in  many  cases 
the  circumstances  of  these  routes  differ considerably  from 
those  of  the  Community,  and  that  in  consequence  the  regime 
adopted will  vary widely.  In  addition,  it is clear that  any 
changes  in the  air services provided within  the  Community 
will affect,  in varying  degrees,  those  provided  to  and  from 
immediately  neighbouring  states.  As  indicated earlier,  the 
Commission  has  tried to take  this  into  account.  Further,  it 
believes  that any  changes  brought  about  by  its proposals will 
be  gradual  in their effect and  that the other  ECAC  states and 
their airlines will have  adequate  time  to adjust.  It will  in 
any  case  seek  to  develop  closer consultation with  these 
states with  a  view  to avoiding  any  problems  that might 
otherwise arise.  In  some  cases,  such  machinery  already exists 
(e.g.with  Norway  and  Sweden  because  of their participation in 
the  SAS  Consortium)  and  the  Commission  attaches  great 
importance  to it. - 51  -
91.  The  Commission  has,  pursuant  to Article  229,  entered  into 
co-operation agreements  on  behalf of  the  Community  with  the 
European Civil Aviation Conference  (ECAC)  and  Eurocontrol. 
92.  The  Community  has  already established  legislation in certain 
areas  that  come  within  the  purview of  ICAO  (e.g.noise 
control,  and  facilitaticn).  The  Commission will  seek  to 
develop  co-operation with  and  participation as  an  observer  in 
the  work  of  ICAO. 
PROCEDURAL  MEASURES 
93.  The  Commission  is of the  opinion  that non-discrimination 
provisions  and  a  standstill clause,  similar to the  one 
contained  in Article  76  of  the  Treaty,  would  also  be  useful 
in the air transport  sector  in  order  to prevent  the  increase 
of discriminatory measures  in  the  Member  States  as  regards 
the  provision of air  services.  Consequently it is presenting 
(Annex  V)  a  proposal  for  this  purpose  to the  Council.  It is 
desirable  that  the  existing situation  should  not  be  made  less 
favourable  in its effects  on  carriers of  the  other  Member 
States while  the  package  is being  discussed.  This  decision 
should  therefore be  adopted  as  quickly  as possible. 
94.  In addition to the  proposals  set out  in  Annexes  I-III  and  V, 
to this Comnunication,  Annex  VI  contains  a  detailed work 
programme  up  to  1986,  as  suggested  by  Parliament.  The 
Programme  has  been  formulated  in the  light of  the policies 
developed  in this Communication. ANNEXES 
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Amended  proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  ••• 1 ••• /EEC  on  fares 
for  scheduled  air  transport  between  Member  States 
Old  text  New  text 
Preamble 
Whereas  the  adoption  of  this measure  together 
with  the  Council  Regulation  laying  down  the 
procedure  for  the  rules  on  competition  apply-
ing  to  undertakings  in  the  air transport 
sector  (1),  the  Council  Regulation  on  the 
application of  Article  85(3)  of  the  Treaty 
to  certain  categories  of  agreements  and 
concerted  practices  in  the  air transport 
sector  (2)  and  the  Council  Decision  on 
bilateral  agreements,  arrangements  and 
memoranda  of  understanding  between  Member 
States  relating  to air transport  (3)  should 
bring  about  substantial  economic  progress 
in  the  air transport  sector  with  resulting 
benefits  to  the  consumer. 
Directive 
SCOPE  AND  DEFINITIONS 
Article  1 
This  directive  applies  to  government 
procedures  and  criteria to  be  applied 
with  respect  to  the  fixing  of  scheduled 
air tariffs for  passengers  and  air 
freight,  established  by  air  carriers 
between  a  point  in  one  Member  State  to 
a  point  in  another  Member  State. 
Article  2 
For  the  purposes  of  this  directive 
a)  Air  tariffs  mean  the  prices  to  be 
paid  in  the  applicable  Local  Legal 
tender  for  the  carriage  by  air of 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
passengers, 
Article  1 
This  Directive  shall  apply  to  government 
procedures  and  criteria  to  be  applied  with 
respect  to  the  establishment  of  scheduled 
air  fares  charged  by  air  carriers  for 
carriage  of  passengers  between  a  point  in 
one  Member  State  to  a  point  in  another 
Member  State. 
Article  2 
For  the  purposes  of  this  Directive 
a)  Scheduled air  fares  mean  the  prices  to 
be  paid  in  the  applicable national 
currency  for  the  carriage of  passengers 11.2 
baggage  and  freight,  in  accordance  with 
the  conditions  under  which  those  prices 
apply,  including  prices  and  conditions 
offered to  intermediaries; 
b)  Air  carrier means  an  air transport 
enterprise which  is  authorised  by  two 
or  more  Member  States to operate 
scheduled  international air  services 
between  those states; 
and  baggage  on  scheduled air services, 
in  accordance  with  the  conditions 
under  which  those  prices  apply,  in-
cluding prices  and  conditions  offered 
to  intermediaries; 
b)  Zone  of  flexibility  means  a  pricing 
zone  grouping  together  air  fares 
with  similar  characteristics  within 
which  double  approval  is  not  required. 
The  range  of  a  zone  is  calculated as 
a  percentage of  its upper  Limit. 
c)  Fixed  individual  air fare  means  a 
scheduled  air fare  established out-
side a  zone  of  flexibility; 
d)  Air  carrier  means  an  air  transport 
enterprise which  is  authorised  by 
two  or  more  Member  States  to  operate 
scheduled  international  air  services 
between  those  states  ; 
e)  A third  freedom  air  carrier means  an 
air  carrier  having  the  right  to  put 
down,  in  the  territory of  a  foreign 
country,  passengers,  freight  and  mail 
taken  in  the  country  in  which  it  is 
registered. 
A fourth  freedom  air carrier  means 
an  air carrier  having  the  right  to 
take  on,  in  a  foreign  country,  passen-
gers,  freight  and  mail,  for  off-
Loading  in  its  country  of  registration. 
A fifth  freedom  air carrier  means  an 
air carrier having  the  right  to  under-
take  the  commercial  air transport  of 
passengers,  freight  and  mail  between 
two  countries  other  than  its country 
of  registration. c)  State of  origin means  the  Member  State 
from  which  the  carriage  commences  in 
respect  of  which  an  air tariff is 
established,  i.e.  both  for  single  and 
return air tariffs; 
d)  State of  destination  means  the  Member 
State  in  which  the  carriage  terminates 
in  respect  of  which  an  air tariff is 
established; 
e)  States  concerned  mean  the  state of 
origin  and  the  state of  destination; 
f)  Interlining means  a  facility  conferred 
by  a  ticket  or  an  airwaybill  granting 
the  right  to  use  more  than  one  airline 
for  the  carriage; 
g)  Scheduled  air  service  means  a  series 
of  flights  each  possessing all  the 
following  characteristics  : 
i)  it  is  performed  by  aircraft  for  the 
transport  of  passengers  or  cargo 
for  remuneration,  in  such  a  manner 
that  each  flight  is  open  to  use  by 
members  of  the  public; 
ii)  is operated  so  as  to  service  traffic 
between  the  same  two  or  more  points, 
either 
C1)  according  to  a  published  time-
table,  or 
(2)  with  fligh~ so  regular  or  fre-
quent  that  they  constitute  a 
recognized  systematic  series. 
II.3 
f)  State of  origin means  the  Member 
State  from  which  the  carriage 
commences  in  respect  of  which  an 
air  fare  is established,  i.e.  both 
for  single  and  return air  fares; 
g)  State of  destination  means  the 
Member  State  in  which  t1e  carriage 
terminates  in  respect  of.which  an 
air  fare  is  established; 
h)  States  concerned  mean  the  state of 
origin  and  the  state of  destination; 
i)  Scheduled  air  service  means  a 
series  of  flights  each  possessing 
all  the  following  characteristics 
i)  it  passes  through  the air  space 
over  the  territory of  more  than 
one  Member  State; 
ii)  it  is  performed  by  aircraft  for 
the  transport  of  passengers  or 
passengers  and  cargo  and/or  mail 
for  remuneration,  in  such  a 
manner  that  each  flight  is  open 
to  use  by  members  of  the  public; 
iii)  it  is  operated  so  as  to  serve 
traffic  between  the  same  two 
or  more  points,  either 
(1)  according  to  a  published 
time-table,  or 
(2)  with  flights  so  regular  or 
frequent  that  they  constitute 
a  recognizably  systematic 
series. II.4 
CRITERIA 
Article  3 
1.  The  States  c~ncerned shall  take all 
appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that 
air  tariffs 
a)  are  reasonably  related  to  the 
costs  of  an  efficient air carrier 
on  the  assumption  that  its princi-
pal  place  of  business  is  Located 
in  the  state of  origin,  while 
allowing  for  a  satisfactory  return 
on  investment  and  taking  due 
account  of  the  characteristics  of 
the  route; 
b)  are  sufficient  to  cover  the  costs 
of  the  carrier on  the  route  in 
question  plus  a  reasonable  margin 
for  overheads  and  profit; 
c)  have  due  regard  to  the  requirements 
of  various  user  categories  and 
encourage  the  development  of  demand 
by  new  categories  of  users  while 
the tariff structure  shall  remain 
as  simple  as  possible; 
d)  are  offered  on  conditions  which  are 
clear  and  understandable. 
Article  3 
1.  States  concerned  shall  for  a  route 
approve  fixed  individual  air fares 
and/or  zones  of  flexibility  in 
accordance  with  article  5  and  6. 
2.  The  States  concerned  shall  take all 
appropriate  measures  to  ensure  that 
air  fares  established  for  a  route, 
whether  as  fixed  individual  air  fares 
or  within  zones  of  flexibility 
a)  are  reasonably  related  to  the costs 
of  the  applicant  third or  fourth 
freedom  air carrier operating  on 
that  route  while  allowing  for  a 
satisfactory  return  on  investment 
and  taking  due  account  of  the 
market  place; 
b)  generate  sufficient  revenue  to 
cover  the direct  operating  costs 
of  the  individual  third or-fourth 
freedom  air carrier on  the  route 
in  question; 
c)  have  due  regard  to  the  requirements 
of  significant  user  categories  and 
encourage  the  development  of  demand 
by  new  categories  of  users  while 
the  fare  structure  r.ero1ains  as 
simple  as  possible; 
d)  are  offered  on  conditions  which  are 
clear  and  understandable. 2.  An  air carrier shall,  however,  be 
permitted  to  match  an  existing tariff 
tariff,  which  has  been  approved  for 
another  airline  in  accordance  with 
the  Directive  for  the  same  route  with 
.  .  .  .  *  the  same  or1g1nat1ng  po1nt  • · 
PROCEDURES 
Article  4 
Member  States  shall  permit  an  air 
carrier to establish air tariffs  : 
a)  individually, 
or 
b)  at  the  option  that  air carrier, 
following  consultation  with  any 
other airlineCs)  for  the  purpose 
of  fixing  the  terms  of  interlining 
or  in  order  to  simplify  and  stan-
dardise  conditions  associated  with 
air  tariff~.  Member  States  concerned 
and  the  Commission  may  participate 
as  observers  at  these  consultations. 
*  This  subject  has  been  moved  to 
articLe  5. 7. 
II .5 
Article  4 
Member  States shall  permit  air carrier(s) 
at  the  option  of  each  individual  air 
carrier to propose  fixed  individual air 
fares  and  zones  of  flexibility  and  file 
air  fares  either  : 
a)  following  consultation  with  any  other 
air  carrieres>  provided  the  consul-
tations  take  place  under  the  condi-
tions  of  a  Commission  Regulation 
Laid  down  subject  to Regulation 
( 2) • 
or 
b)  individually. 
( 2) 11.6 
Article  5 
1.  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions 
of  article 6  hereof,  air tariffs 
shall  be  approved  by  the  states 
concerned. 
2.  For  this  purpose air tariffs esta-
blished  by  an  air carrier shall  be 
filed with  the states  concerned. 
3.  Such  filing  may  be  required  by  those 
sf~tes not  more  than  60  days  before 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  air 
tariffs. 
Article  5 
1.  Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions 
of  Article  6  hereof,  fixed  individual 
air fares  and  zones  of  flexibility 
shall  be  approved  or  decided  by  the 
States  concerned  and  remain  in  force 
until  replaceo. 
2.  For  this  purpose  third  and  fourth  free-
dom  air carriers(s)  shall  be  invited  to 
submit  proposals  to  the  States  concerned. 
3.  Such  submission  may  be  required  by 
those  States  not  more  than  60  days 
before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  fixed 
individual  air  fares  and  zones  of 
flexibility. 
4.  Decisions  on  a  zone  of  flexibility  shall 
be  given  expressly  by  the  States 
concerned. 
5.  Within  a  zone  of  flexibility  States 
concerned  shall  permit  third or  fourth 
freedom  air carriers  to  charge  air  fares 
at  their  own  choice  provided  those  air 
fares  have  been  filed  with  the  States 
concerned  not  later  than  14  days  before 
their entry  in  force,  unless  those 
States  agree  to  : 
- exercise a  system  of  double  dis-
approval; 
- exercise a  system  of  country  of 
origin approval. 4.  Approval  may  be  given  expressly,  but 
unless  one  of  those  states decides 
otherwise  within  30  days  following 
the  filing  the  filed  air tariffs 
shall  be  considered  as  approved. 
Article  6 
1.  When  a  state  concerned  (hereafter 
called  the  first  state)  decides  not 
to  approve  an  air tariff  in  confor-
mity  with  article 5.4,  it shall 
inform  the  airline  and  the  other 
state  concerned  (hereafter  called 
the  second  state)  in  writing  stating 
its  reasons. 
2.  If  the  second  state agrees  with  the 
decision  of  the  first  state,  the 
state of  origin  shall  request  the 
airline  concerned  to file  a  new  air 
tariff. 
3.  If  the  second  state disagrees  with 
the decision  of  the  first  state,  it 
shall  so  notify  the  first  state 
within  2  weeks  of  being  informed  and 
request  a  consultation.  The  first 
state shall  make  its  representatives 
available  at  short  notice  for  consul-
tation  on  the  air tariff(s).  For  this 
l.t.'T 
6.  Fixed  individual  air fares  shall  be 
submitted  for  double  approval  to  the 
States  concerned. 
Approval  may  be  given  expressly,  but 
unless  one  of  those States decides 
otherwise  within  30  days  following 
the  submission  the  proposed  air  fares 
shall  be  considered  as  approved. 
7.  States  concerned  shall  permit  an  air 
carrier operating  a  direct  or  indirect 
scheduled  air  service  on  a  route  to 
match  an  air  fare  approved  for  that 
same  route  provided  the  indirect  air 
service  is  not  more  than  20%  Longer 
in  distance  than  the direct  service. 
Article  6 
1.  When  a  State  concerned  (herP.inafter 
called  the  first  State)  decides  not  to 
approve  or  agree  a  fixed  individual 
air  fare  and/or  a  zone  of  flexibility 
in  conformity  with  Article  5(4)or  5(6~ 
it shall  inform  the  other  State 
concerned  <hereafter  called  the  second 
State)  in  writing  stating  its  reasons. 
2.  If  the  second  State agrees  with  the 
decision  of  the  first  State,  the  fixed 
individual  air  fare  and/or  the  zone 
of  flexibility  shall  not  come  into 
force. 
3.  If  the  second State disagrees  with  the 
decision of  the  first state, it shall 
so  notify  the  first State within  two 
weeks  of  being  informed  and  request 
a  consultation.  The  first  State  shall 
make  its  representatives  available at 
short  notice  for  consultation on  the 
fixed  individual  air  fare  or  zone  of 11.8 
consultation  the states  concerned 
shall  on  request  s~pply all  relevant 
information  to  each  other.  At  the 
consultation  the  states  concerned 
shall  endeavour  to  agree  on  the air 
tariff as  filed or  agree  on  modifi-
cations  thereto. 
4.  If at  the  expiry  of  one  month  after 
the  date  on  which  the  second  state 
was  notified disagreement  still 
persists,  the  state of  origin  can 
approve  the  air tariff unilaterally, 
after  having  ascertained  that  the 
criteria of  article  3  are  met,  or 
subject  to  such  modifications  as  will 
make  it comply  with  article 3.  In 
this  case  the  air tariff shall  come 
into  force  two  weeks  after  the  appro-
val  of  the  state of  origin  where  the 
other  state  concerned  within  this 
period  refers  the  matter  to  the 
Commission  for  decision  under 
paragraph  6. 
flexibility.  For  this consultation the 
~tates concerned  shall on  request 
supply  all  relevant  information  to 
each  other.  At  the  consultation  the 
States  concerned  shall  endeavour  to 
agree  on  the  fixed  individual  air  fare 
or  zone  of  flexibility.  One  of  the  two 
States  concerned  may  request  the 
Commission  to  be  present  at  the 
consultation. 
4.  If, at  the  expiry  of  one  month  after 
the  date on  which  the  second State  was 
notified,  disagreement  still persists 
with  respect  to existing services,  the 
State of origin may,subject  to Article  3, 
approve  either fixed  individual  air 
fares  or  zones  of  flexibility,  provided 
that  it may  not  give  such  approval 
where  the  other State  has  agreed  or  is 
prepared  to  agree  to  zones  of  flexibi-
Lity  for  at  Least  two  products  on  the 
route  or  routes  in  question,  which 
respect  the  criteria set  out  in  para-
graph  5. 
5.  The  criteria which  the  two  zones  of 
flexibility  referred  to  in  paragraph 
4  must  satisfy are as  follows  : 
<a>  each  zone  must  have  a  minimum 
range  of  25%;  and 
(b)  the  first  zone  ·shall  extend  at  Least 
__ J5%  on  either side  of  the  existing 
air  fare  for  economy  class  and  the 
other  zone  shall  be  situated  below 
the  first  and  cover  restricted  use 
air fares. 5.  Where  no  agreement  is  reached  under 
the  procedure  set  out  in  paragraph 
3,  or  where  ;;ction  is taken  under 
paragraph  4,  the  dispute  may,  at  the 
request  of  any  Member  State  concerned, 
be  referred to  the  Commission. 
6.  The  Commission  shall  within  30  working 
days  of  the  date  of  referral after 
consulting  the  Member  States  concerned 
take  a  decision.  Upon  referral  of  a 
dispute  to  the  Commission,  the  states 
concerned  shall  immediately  make 
available all  pertinent  information  at 
their disposal  to  the  Commission.  The 
Commission  shall  notify  its decision 
to  the  state  concerned. 
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6.  Fixed  individual air fares  or  zones  of 
flexibility  approved  under  paragraph  4 
shall  come  into  force  two  weeks  after 
approval. 
7.  Where  no  agreement  is  reached  under  the. 
procedure  set  out  in  paragraph  3,  or 
where  action  is taken  under  paragraph  4, 
the  Commission  shall  be  informed  thereof 
by  the  second State  or  the State of 
origin  respectively. 
7.  In  the  absence  of  a  decision  by  the 
Commission  within  30  working  days  from 
the  date  of  referral  the air tariff 
shall  come  into effect  until  such  date 
as  the decision  of  the  Commission  comes 
into  force. 
Article  7 
GENERAL  PROVISIO~S 
Article  7 
1.  At  least  once  a  year,  each  Member 
State shall  call  on  an  Air  Transport 
Users  Committee  to  express  its opi-
nion  on  air  fares  and  related  matters 
for  which  purpose  the  members  of  the 
Committee  shall  be  supplied  with  an 
appropriate  information.  This  Com-
mittee  shall  in  each  Member  State 
include  the  main  consumers'  inte-
rests  concerned  with  matters  of  this 
kind.  If  no  such  Committee  exists,  the 
state  concerned  shall  set  one  up. 
f.  At  Least  once  a  year,  the  Commission 
shaU consult  with  representatives  of 
air  transport  user  organisations  in  the 
Community,  including  the  Federation  of 
Air  Transport  User  Representatives  in 
the  EEC  CFATUREC),on  air tariffs and 
related matters,  for  which  purpose  the 
Commission  shall  supply  appropriate 
information  to the  participants. I I .1 0 
2.  The  Commission  shall  convene  perio- 2.  Member  States shall  encourage  the esta-
dically,  at  least  once  a  year,  repre- blishment  within their territories of 
sentatives of  the  t~ansport users  committees  representing airline users 
committees  referred  to  in  paragraph  1,  if no  such  committee  exists. 
for  an  exchange  of  views  at  Community 
level. 
Article  8 
1.  The  Commission  shall  every  second 
year  after  the  1st  of  January,  1983, 
publish  a  report  on  the  scheduled 
air tariffs to  which  this directive 
applies. 
2.  For  the  purposes  of  this  report,  the 
Member  States  shall  inform  the  Com-
mission  of  all  such  air tariffs 
filed  with  them  and  of  any  instance 
when  article 6  has  been  invoked 
during  the  relevant  period,  and,  at 
the  request  of  the  Commission,  pro-
vide  details  with  respect  to  the  con-
formity  of  the  procedures  actually 
adopted  by  Member  States  with  the 
provisions of  this directive  and  the 
conformity  of  such  air tariffs  with 
the  criteria  in article 3. 
3.  Before  issuing  the  report,  the  Com-
mission  shall  as  it thinks  fit  con-
sult  with  the  representatives  of  the 
Air  Transport  Users  Committees,  air-
Lines,  governments  and  other  inte-
rested parties. 
3.  Users  shall at all  times  be  enabled 
to  acquaint  t.nernselves  with  the 
rates  and  consitions  of  carriage 
applied by  the airlines.  Particulars 
to  be  specified shall  include  the 
exact  extent  of  the  services  covered 
by  any  charge  levied  by  the  airline,  and 
other  practice  in  such  matters. 
Article 8 
1.  The  Commission  shall  every  second 
year  after  1  January  1987  publish 
a  report  on  the  application  of  this 
Directive,  which  shall  include statis-
tical  information  on  the  cases  where 
Article  6  has  been  invoked. 
2.  Member  States  and  the  Commission  shall 
co-operate  on  the  application  of  this 
Directive,  particularly as  regards  the 
collection of  the  information  referred 
to  in  paragraph  1. 4.  Confidential  information obtained 
by  the  application  of  this direc-
tive  is  covered  by  the  professional 
secrecy. 
Article  9 
Air  tariffs being  applied  at  the  entry 
into  force  of  this directive  remain 
valid  until  replaced  by  other air 
tariffs. 
Article  10 
Where  a  Member  State  has  concluded  an 
agreement  with  one  or  more  third 
countries,  which  gives  fifth  freedom 
rights  for  a  route  between  Member 
States  to  an  air carrier of  a  third 
country  and  in  this  respect  contains 
provisions  incompatible  with  this 
Directive,  the  Member  State  shall  take 
at  the  first opportunity  all  appropri-
ate  steps  to  eliminate  such  incompa-
tibilities.  Until  such  time  as  the 
incompatibilities  have  been  elimi-
nated  this directive  shall  not  affect 
the  rights  and  obligations  vis-a-vis 
third  countries  arising  from  such  an 
agreement. 
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Article 9 
Confidential  information obtained  by  the 
application of  this Directive  shall  be 
covered  by  professional  secrecy. 
Article  10 
This Directive  shall  apply  only  to  fixed 
individual  air fares  and  zones  of  flexi-
bility  intended  to  come  into operation 
after 1  April  1985. 
Article  11 
Where  a  Member  State  has  concluded  an  agree-
ment  with  one  or  more  non-member  countries, 
which  gives  fifth  freedom  rights  for  a  route 
between  Member  States  to  an  air carrier of 
a  non-member  country  and  in  this  respect 
contains  provisions  which  are  incompatible 
with  this  Directive,  the  Member  State  shall 
take  at  the  first  opportunity all  appropri-
ate  steps  to eliminate  such  incompatibili-
ties.  Until  such  time  as  the  incompatibili-
ties have  been  eliminated,  this  Directive 
shall  not  affect  the  rights  and  obligations 
vis-a-vis non-member  countries arising  from 
such  an  agreement. 
Article  11  Article  12 
1.  The  Member  State  shall,  before  1.  The  Member  States shall,  before  1  Janu-
1  January  1983,  and  after  consul- ary  1985,  and  after  consultation  with 
tation  with  the  Commission,  take  the  the  Commission,  take  the  necessary  steps 
necessary  steps  to  amend  their  Laws  to  amend  their  Laws  and  administrative 
and  administrative  provisions  to  provisions  to  comply  with  this  Direc-
comply  with  this directive.  tive. 11.12 
2.  Such  measures  shall  cover,  inter  2.  Such  measures  shall  cover,  inter alia, 
alia,  the  organisation of,  proce- the organisation of,  procedures  for 
dures  for  and  means  of  control,  and  and  means  of  control,  and  the  penalties 
the  penalties  for  any  breach.  .for any  breach. 
3.  The  Member  States shall  communicate  3.  The  Member  States  shall  communicate 
to  the  Commission  all  Laws  and  ad- to  the  Commission  all  Laws  and  admini-
ministrative  1rovisions  made  in  strative provisions  made  in  furtherance 
furtherance  of  this directive.  of  this directive. 
Article  12  Article  13 
This  directive  is  addressed  to  the  This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member 
Member  States.  States. ;  . 
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Content of an  intended  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  exempting 
certain commercial  agreements  and  concerted practices  in the 
air transport sector 
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Subject to the  enabling  Regulation at Annex  III  B  being  adopted 
by  the  Council  and  subject  to agreement  on  the  overall  package 
contained  in this memorandum,  it would  be  the  Commission's  in-
tention,  taking  account  of the  normal  consultative procedures, 
to adopt  a  group  exemption  Regulation  along  the  following 
lines  : 
Agreements,  decisions  and  concerted practices by airlines 
relating to air transport between  Member  States shall  be 
exempted  from  the prohibition set out  in Article 85(1)  of 
the  Treaty until  31  December  1991  if they have  any of the 
following  objectives  : 
- joint planning of  the  capacity to be  provided  on  a 
scheduled air service,  on  condition that  any  party can 
withdraw without penalty on  giving  3  months  notice: 
sharing  of  revenue  from  scheduled  services on  condition 
that the  transfer does  not  exceed  1  % of  the  revenue 
earned  on  a  particular route by  the  transferring partner, 
no  costs  are  shared  or  accepted  by  the  transferring 
partner,  and  the  transfer  is made  by  way  of compensation 
for  the detriment  incurred  by  the  transferee  in  schedu-
ling  flights  at  less  busy  times  of day  or during  less 
busy  periods: 
- the  common  preparation of proposals on price  and  trans-
.. port  conditions  for  transmittal  of the  competent  natio-
nal  authorities  for-deciSion  J.n  conformity with  the 
procedure  set out  in the directive on  air tariffs,  on 
condition that any airline is free  to introduce  indivi-
dual  proposals  and  on  condition that the  Commission  and 
the  Member  States  may  participate as  observers  in  such 
consultations. III  C.2 
As  regards  agreements  which  are  in existence when  the  Commis-
sion's Regulation  comes  into  force,  the  exemption  shall have 
retroactive effect  from  the  time when  the  conditions of appli-
cation  of  this  Regulation  were  fulfilled.  As  regards all other 
agreements  the  exemption  shall have  effect  from  the  time  when 
the  conditions of application of  the  Commission's  Regulation 
are  fulfilled. 
l~ere the  Commission,  either on  its own  initiative or at the 
request of  a  Member  State or  of natural or  legal persons clai-
ming  a  legitimate  interest,  finds  that  in  any  particular case 
agreements  or  concerted practices which  receive  the  benefit of 
the  group  exemption  have  nevertheless  certain effects which  are 
incompatible with  the  conditions  laid  down  in Article 85(3)  of 
the Treaty,  it may  in order  to put  an  end  to those  effects take 
action  in conformity with  Article  7  of Council  Regulation  No. 
(see  Annex  III  B). ANNEX  IV 
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IV.1 
I.  Introduction 
1.  The  purpose  of  this paper  is  to  state  the  policy  of  the  Commission 
in  relation to  state aids  to air transport  operations  and  to place  it  in 
the  overall  context  of  its policy  towards  state aids  in  general. 
2.  At  the  same  t·ime  the  Commission  considers  that  its policy  with  regard 
to state aid  to  the  air transport  sector  is  a  necessity  for  anp  a  part  of 
the  general  air  transport  policy  for  the  Community.  It  cannot,  of  course, 
be  a  substitute  for  a  Community  air transport  policy,  since  the  control  of 
state aids  cannot  by  itself create all  the  necessary  market  conditions  for 
such  a  policy.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  unless  the  state  aid  rules  are 
properly  applied  any  increase  in  competition  between  airlines  could  result 
in  the  financing  of  such  competition  out  of  state aid,  in  short  a  subsidy 
race.  This  is manifestly  undesirable. 
3.  Although  the  air  transport  sector  includes  inter alia airlines, 
airports  and  air traffic  control  authorities,  the  Commission  decided  as  a 
matter  of  both  priority and  convenience  to  commence  with  a  general  study 
of  state aids  to  the  airline part  of  the  sector.  The  Commission  is satisfied 
that  this  approach  has  enabled  an  objective  study  to  be  undertaken  and  that 
the principal  conclusions  in  respect  of  airlines  would  not  have  differed 
if the  rest  of  the  sector  had  been  included  at  this  stage. 
4.  Througho~t this  paper,  therefore,  references  to  the  "air transport 
sector",  "air transport",  or  "this  sector"  should,  where  appropriate,  be 
interpreted as  referring  to .the  airline part  of  the  air  transport  sector 
only.  However,  some  of  the  sections,  such  as  section  II  on  the  Legal  Framework, 
have  a  broader  a~plication.  Also,  while  the  issues  discussed  in  sections 
, IV  to  VII  have  general  relevance"  any  conclusions  drawn  h:llve.  been  related 
solely  to  the  airline  industry. IV.2 
II.  Legal  Framework 
5.  The  Treaty  contains  provisions  on  State Aids  both  in  the  Chapter 
dealing  with  Competition  and  in  the Title on  Transport. 
Article  92  states  the  general  rule  that  State  Aids  ~hich distort  or  threaten 
to distort  corr1etition are  incompatible  with  the  Common  Market  in  so  fa~ as 
they  affect  traje between  Member  States.  It  goes  on  to  provide  that  certain 
types  of  aid shall  be  compatible  with  the  Common  Market  (e.g.  aid having  a 
social  character,  granted  to  individual  consumers)  and  that  other  types 
may  be  considered  to  be  compatible  with  the  Common  Market  Cviz  aid  to 
promote  economic  development  of  poor  areas~ aids  to  promote  projects of 
common  European  interest  or  to  remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in  a  Member  State's 
economy,  aid  to facilitate  the  development  of  certain economic  activities or 
of  certain economic  areas). 
6.  Article  93  provides  that  if the  Commission  finds  that  a  S~ate Aid 
is  incompatible  with  the  Common  Market,  having  regard  to  Article 92,  it 
shall  decide  that  the  aid  shall  be  abolished  or  altered.  If  the  State  concerned 
does  not  comply,  the  Commission  may  refer  the  matter directly to  the  Court. 
7.  The  Member  States  are  also obliged  under  Article 93.3 to  inform  the 
Commission  of  any  plans  to  grant  or  alter aid.  Furthermore  the  Member  States 
are  prohibited  from  implementing  the  proposed  measures  until  the  procedure 
laid  down  has  resulted  in  a  final  decision  on  the  compatibility  with  the. 
Common  M~rket of  the  aid  in  question.  However,  the  Court  has  ruled  that 
the  Commission  should  normally  give  its decision  within  two  months  of  receipt 
of  all  the  necessary  information  including  any  supplementary  information 
requested  (in  certain  cases  the  Commission  has  undertaken  to  respond  quicker) 
and  in  the  absence  of  a  Commission  decision  within  the  time  limit,  the 
Member  State  is  free  to  implement  the  aid.  This  does  not  prevent  the  Commission 
from  subsequently  reviewing  the  aid  as  an  existing aid. 
8.  It  can  be  seen  from  the  above  that  it is  for  the  Commission  to  decide 
in  particular  cases  whether  state aids  may  be  considered  compatible  with 
the  Common  Market  under  Article 92.  Also,  in  the  event  that  the  Commission 
decides  that  in  a  particular  case  aid  is  incompatible  with  the  Common  Market, 
it  has  to decide  whether  the  aid  should  be  abolished  or  merely  altered, and 
it may  decide  to give  the  M~mber State  time  to  undertake  the  abolition or 
alterations and  if so  how  much  time. IV.3 
III.  Notification of state aids  in  the air transport  sector 
9.  A consistent  application  by  the  Commission  of  its powers,  is, of 
course,  dependant  on  the  Member  States  observing  their obligation to notify 
State  Aids  under  Article 93.3  <see  paragraph  7  above>.  Indications  that 
this  was  not  necessarily  the  case  led  the  Commission  in July  1980  to  remind 
all  M~mber States  by  letter of  their obligation  in  this  respect  (1). 
The  Commission  informed  the  Member  States,  inter alia, that  it considered 
the full  application of  Article 93.3  to  be  absolutely  necessary. 
10.  In  1981  and  1982  the  Commission  convened  a number  of  meetings  with 
experts  from  Member  States  in order  to  seek  their opinion on  certain matters 
concerning  state aids  in  the  air  transport  sector, and  agreed  subsequently 
to  restrict  the  exercise,  at  least  initially, to aid  to airlines.  All  the 
~ember States  have  now  supplied  informatio~ concerning  state aids  to air 
carriers  and/or  information  on  the  financial  relationships  between  them 
and  their state owned  airlines. 
11.  The  following  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  types  of  aid  granted by  one 
or  more  Member  States  to  airlines  and/or  the  financial  relations  between 
them.  Such  financial  relations  may  constitute  state aids,  or  normal 
commercial  transactions  between,the  owner  of  an  enterprise  and  that 
enterprise.  It has  been  compiled  solely  from  the  information  supplied  by 
Member  States; 
This  type  of  aid  has  taken  a  number  of  different  forms;  e.g.  a 
limited  subsidy  on  the airline's  interest  charges  or  of  an  amount 
equal  to  the airline's depreciation  charges  in  respect  of  aircraft, 
s~are parts  and  certain other  equipment;  or  to  cover  the deficit  in 
operating  its scheduled  services. 
(1)  O.J.  C 252  of  30.9.1980,  page  2. IV.4 
(iii) 
This  type  of  aid  is  granted  to assist  in  the  provision of  domestic 
or  intra-Community  flights  (1)  to  remote  regions.  In one  case  the 
aid  is  granted  for  a  short  international  flight  between  a  category  1 
and  a  category  3  airport  which  is  located  in  a  depressed  region  of 
the  second  Member  State. 
E~9~£!iQQ_Qf_Qr_~~~~~!iQQ_fr2~-l~QQiQs_£b~rs~~-fQr_£~rri~r~_frQ~ 
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Aid  may  occur  through  payment  of  lower  landing  charges  for  carriers 
from  a  Member  State  than  for  foreign  carriers or  through  total 
exemption  of  these  landing  charges.  In  the  latter case,  the 
exemption  is part  of  the  compensation  provided  under  a  contract 
between  the  Member  State  and  the  national  airline  for  the  performance 
of  certain public  sefv~ce obligations.  However,  because  of  the  lack 
of  transparency  of  this  contract,  it  is  not  possible  to  determine 
whether  the  aid  is  commensurate  with  the  cost  of  performing  the 
public  service obligations. 
Aid  has  been  granted  to  a  small  regional  carrier  in  order  to  aid 
it acquire  aircraft  for  flights  between  the  mainland  and  islands 
off  the  coast. 
Aid  has  been  provided  to airlines  in  order  to  enable  them  to  use 
certain aircraft  types,  the  operation  of  which  is  not  economically 
viable.  The  aid  has  been  provided  by  writing  off  an  amount  of 
capital  equal  to  the  capital  value  of  the  aircraft  Less  the  residual 
value  thereof  or  by  an  annual  operating  subsidy  to  the  airlines  so 
as  to  cover  their additional  costs. 
. I . 
(1)  Throughout  this  paper  the  term  "intra  Community  flight"  has  been  used 
to  describe  a  flight  from  one  Member  State  to  another;  "internationa~ 
flight"  has  been  used  for  flights  b~tween a  Member  State  and  a  third 
country,  or  between  third  countries. (vi) 
<vii) 
Go~ernment Guarantees  ---------------------
Two  types  of  guarantees  exist  as  : 
(a)  guarantees  by  the  state of  airline borrowings,  normally  for 
aircraft  acquisition; 
(b)  a  Limited  guarantee  in  favour  of  ~ shareholder  in  an  airline 
of  repayment  of  an  amount  equal  to  the  reduction  of  its 
ca~ital contribution  in  the  airline below  a  certain amount 
caused  by  the  airline's  Losses,  subject  always  to  a  fixed 
annual  ceiling. 
Such  aids  may  be  Listed  as  follows  : 
IV.S 
(a)  Preferential  Tax  System.  The  possibil{~y to  deduct  from  taxable 
profits a  certain  proportion  of  the  purchase  price of  an  aircraft, 
p~ovided it  is  used  in  international  transport. 
(b)  Exemption  of  aircraft  fuel  from  taxation.  <In  fact  this  exemption 
exists  in all  Member  States,  and  is  based  on  the  Chicago  Convention). 
(c)  Exemption  from  Value  Added  Tax  of  the  domestic  part  of  international 
air transport.  Foreign  compagnies  also  benefit,  provided  reciprocal 
treatment  is  afforded  by  their countries. 
(d)  Exemption  from  capital  taxation  of  the  capital  of  the  state owned 
airline. 
(e)  Exemption  for  the  state owned  airline  from  paying  custom's  duties. 
Clearly  contributions of  equity  capital  are  made  from  time  to  time  by 
Member  States  to state owned  airlines.  However,  only  one  Member  State 
felt  it necessary  to  inform  the  Commission  of  its contributions  of 
equity  capital  to  the  state owned  airline.  Furthermore  this  Member 
State  took  the  view  that  its equity  contributions  were  normal  financial 
transactions  between  the  owner  of  a  business  and  that  business,  and 
therefore  did  not  constitute aid.  It  may  be  that  some  or  all  of  the 
other  Member  States  share  that  point  of  view,  and  therefore did  not 
feel  it necessary  to  report  such  transactions  to  the  Commission. ·IV.6 
(ix)  ~E~P~~~~~jE~ for  the  provision of  air services  to  the  government 
at  no  charge,  or  at  less  than  the  normal  charge. 
(x)  EIE~]~]E~_E!-~2~E free  of  charge  at  state owned  airports. 
One  Member  State  has  from  time  to  time  sought  the  Commission's  approval 
for  grants  to  an  airline under  an  approved  general  aid  scheme  designed 
to  encourage  investment  in  employment  creating projects.  This  general  aid 
scheme  was  approved  on  the  basis  that  it would  be  necessary  for  the 
Commission  to evaluate  the  compatibility  with  the  Treaty  of  each  indi-
vidual  case  under  the  scheme. 
In  some  such  cases  the  Commission  has  approved  or  raised  no  objection 
to  the  aid  in  question,  whereas  in  a~other case  the  Commission  is still 
considering  the  aid. 
12.  Certain  Member  States  have  provided  justifications for  the  state aids 
granted  by  them.  The  main  justifications  for  these  actions  seem  to  be  : 
(i)  That  the  aids  described  in  paragraph  11(ii),  11(v)  and  11(ix)  constitute 
compensation  for  the  performance  of  public  service obligations. 
(ii)  That  the  state aid  in  question  does  not  distort  or  threaten  to distort 
competition  and/or  does  not  affect  trade  between  Member  States.  For 
example,  it is alleged  that  certain  aids  for  domestic  routes  do  not 
affect  trade  between  Member  States,  or,  if they  do,  only  to  a  negligible 
extent. 
(iii)  That  the  financial  transactions  in  question  <e.g.  guarantees,  contri-
butions  of  equity  capital, etc.)  do  not  constitute  an  aid,  but  are 
part 'of  normal  transactions  between  the  owner  of  a  business  and  that 
business. 
(iv)  That  the  aid  is  justified by  article  92.2  (c)  (aid  granted  to  the 
economy  of  certain areas  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany). 
(v)  That  the  aid  may  be  considered  to  be  compatible  with  article 92.3  (a) 
as  promoting  regional  development.  This  justification has  been  put 
forward  by  certain  Member  States  for  aid  granted  for  the  operation 
of  certain  routes.  However,  other  Member  States  have  advanced  public 
service obligations  as  justification for  the  same  type  of  aid. IV.7 
Cvi)  The  provision  of  aid  so  as  to enable  an  airline to operate  certain 
types  of  aircraft,  instead of  other aircraft  types  which  the  airline 
would  otherwise  have  selected,  has  been  justified by  one  Member  State 
on  the  grounds  of  compatibility  with  article  92.3Cb)  (execution of  an 
important  project  of  common  European  interest)  or  article 92.3Cc) 
(development  of  certain economic  activities or  areas).  Another  Member 
State  has  used  the  concept  of  compensation  for  the  performance  of  a 
public  service obligation  as  justification for  the  same  type  of  aid. IV.8 
IV.  Exercise  of  the  Commission's  Responsibilities- General 
13.  The  Commission  will  exercise  its  responsibilities  in  relation  to  aids 
to  air  transport  to  ensure  that  competition  is  not  distorted and  to  further 
Community  objectives  and  the  development  of  the  common  market. 
The  corollary of  this  is  that  the  Commission  in  its evaluation of  aid 
proposals  cannot  normally  accept  national  objectives  as  necessarily 
sufficient  to  justify the  use  of  aids;  whether  they  are or  not  will  depend 
6n  the  repercussions  on  the  common  interest. 
14.  While  it  is difficult  to  provide  theoretical  examples  of  how  these 
general  ~rinciples would  be  applied  in  practice,  they  could  be  relevant 
to  the  structure of  an  airline's network  of  routes.  For  example,  from  a 
purely  national  point  of  view,  it might  be  considered  essential  that  an 
airline provide  a  specified  route  network.  However,  this  might  only  be 
possible  if substantial  state aids  were  provided.  The  Commission  could 
only  approve  such  aids  under  the  derogations  contained  in  Article  92.3, 
if overall  Community  objectives  would  be  served  by  the  carrier  in  question 
continuing  to  provide  these  services. 
15.  The  Commission's  policy  with  regard  to  aids  in  the  air transport 
sector  is  also  dependent  to  a  certain extent  on  its assessment  of  the 
economic  situation of  the  Community  air transport  industry.  In  other  sectors 
the  Commission's  policy  has  varied  depending  on  its perception  of  the 
industry  in  question  as  being  in  a  state of  crisis,  or  operating  normally, 
and  adjusting  to  the  changing  needs  of  the  market.  While  the  rate  of 
return  on  capital  employed  in  the  airline  industry  in  Europe  has  been  below 
the  average  for  industry generally,  nevertheless  the  typical  pattern for 
most  airlines  has  been  of  cyclical  fluctuations  from  profit  to  Loss. 
16.  The  present  difficulties  of  the  airline  industry  in  Europe  are  seen 
as  a  temporary  phenomena  caused  by  the  corrbination  of  a  rapid  increase 
in  fuel  prices  and  the  general  economic  recession.  An  improvement  in  the 
economic  situation of  European  airlines  is  generally  expected,  and  indeed 
recent  indications  suggest  that  it  may  have  started.  The  Commission  considers 
therefore  that  circumstances  do  not  justify any  derogation  under  Article  92.3 
from  the  general  rule  Laid  down  in article 92.1  that  state aids  are  incompatible 
with  the  common  market  if  they  distort  competition  and  affect  trade  between 
Member  States. IV.9 
17.  The  immediate  rigid  application  of  the  aid  rules  to airlines 
might  cause  some  of  them  to  cease  operations.  The  control  will  therefore 
become  systematic  only  with  time. 
18.  The  Commission  may  in  certain cases  decide  in  accordance  with 
article  92  that  aids  may  be  grant~d to  individual  airlines,  whic,. have 
serious  financial  difficulties,  provided  certain conditions  are  met  : 
a)  The  aids  must  form  part  of  a  programme,  to  be  approved  by  the 
Commission,  to  restore  the airline's health,  so  that  it can, 
within  a  reasonably  short  period,  be  expected  to operate 
viably  without  further  aid.  Thus  the  aids  must  be  of  limited 
duration.  If  the  restoration of  financial  viability requires 
capacity  reductions,  this  would  be  included  in  the  programme.  Any 
alterations'in  the  programme  would  also  have  to  be  approved  by 
the  Commission.  Naturally  any  proposed  changes  to  the  aids 
would  also  have  to  be  notified  to  the  Commission. 
b)  The  aids  in question  must  not  transfer  the difficulties  from 
that  Member  State to  the  rest of  the  Community. 
c)  Any  such  aids  must  be  structured  so  that  they  are  transparent 
and  can  be  controlled. 
19.  In  the  case  of  aids,  which  have  purposes  other  than  the  needs  of 
the  airline  industry  as  such,  including  regional  aids,  the  Commission 
will  also  ensure  that  Community  objectives  are  furthered  before  agreeing 
to  grant  a  derogation  under  Prticle 92.3 
In  the  case  of  aids  for  regional  development  purposes  the  Commission  wilt 
have  regard  to  its general  policy  for  such  aids,  as  set  out,  for  example, 
in  the  principles  it adopted  for  coordination  of  regional  aids. IV.  10 
V.  Distinction  between  the state's  role  as  owner  of  an  enterprise  and 
as  provider  of  state aid  to  that  enterprise 
20.  The  neutrality of  the  Treaty  in  respect  of  ownership  of  undertakings 
(article  222)  is  fundamental  in  making  the  necessary  distinction on  a  case 
by  case  basis  that,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  the  same  transaction 
may  constitute either  an  aid,  a  normal  commercial  transaction between  the 
owner  of  an  enterprise and  that  enterprise, or  a  mixture  of  the  two. 
This  difficulty is of  particular  relevance  to  the  air transport  sector 
given  the  predominance  of  state owned  enterprises  in  the  sector. 
21.  A preliminary  examination  of  the  information  supplied  by  Member 
States  reveals  that  the  main  types  of  transaction  which  fall  under  this 
heading  in  the  case  of  airlines  are  the  provision  of  equity  capital  by  the 
state  in  question,  the  guaranteeing  by  the  state of  the airlines  borrowings, 
and  the  provision  by  the  state of  loans.  In  certain cases,  the  distinction 
between  equity  capital  and  loans  has  been  somewhat  blurred. 
22.  In  particular,  reference  should  be  made  to  Commission  Decision 
N°  2320/81/ECSC  (1),  which  received  the  unanimous  assent  of  the  Council. 
The  following  statement  is  contained  in  the  introductory part  :  "When 
assessing  aid  no  discrimination  must  be  practised  between  undertakings, 
notably  on  account  of  their  ownership,  whether  public  or  private. 
Accordingly,  the  rules  established  by  this  Decision  must  also apply  to 
any  aid  elements  contained  in  financing  measures  taken  by  Member  States 
in  respect  of  public-sector steel  undertakings.  These  include  the  provision 
of  equity  capital,  the  setting-off  of  losses,  the  foregoing  of  dividends  or 
of  normal  returns  on  public  funds  or  the  compensation  of  financial  burdens 
imposed  by  public  authorities.  The  Commission's  scrutiny of  such  aid 
elements  cannot  result  in  control  by  it of  the  structure of  the  Member 
States•  economic  systems"  and  later  in article 1  §  2  :  "The  concept  of 
aid  includes  aid granted  by  regional  or  Local  authorities,  and  any  aid 
elements  contained  in  the  financing  measures  taken  by  Member  States  in 
respect  of  the  steel  undertakings  which  theydirectly or  indirectly control 
and  which  do  not  count  as  the  provision of  risk  capital  according  to 
standard  company  practice  in  a  market  economy". 
(1)  Commission  Decision  n°  2320/81/ECSC  of  7.8.81  establishing  Community 
rules  for  aids  to  the  steel  industry;  O.J.  L 228/14  of  13.8.81. IV.11 
While  there  are  important  differences  between  the  steel  and  air transport 
sectors,  there  is  no  reason  why  these  general  principles  should  not  be 
applied  in  a  manner  which  takes  account  of  the  particular  characteristics 
of  the  air  transport  sector. 
2}.  Previously,  when  deciding  on  the  compatibility of  states participating 
in  enterpric •s  in difficulties,  the  Commission  stated that. if it  was  a 
question  of  a~quiring share-holdings  in  the  capital  of  undertakings  who 
could  not  raise  the  necessary  capital  among  normal  financial  sources,  such 
participations  could  contain  elements  of  State aid  which  demand  the 
exercise of  a  control  on  its part. 
24.  In  a  particular  case  <1>  the  Commission  considered  that  the 
acquisition by·the  State of  a  holding  in  a  group  of companies,  the  provision 
of  a  Loan  on  an  interest  free  basis  for  part  of  the  period,  and  the 
provision of  a  State  guarantee  for  loans  previously  raised  by  the  group 
constituted an  aid  within  the  meaning  of  Article  92  §  2 of  the  Treaty. 
25.  Having  established  the  general  principle that  such  transactions  may 
contain  an  aid  element,  it  is  necessar1  to  consider  how  the  general  rule 
may  be  applied  in  particular  cases.  The  guiding  principle  is  whether  the 
financing  measures  contain  elements  which  do  not  count  as  the  provision 
of  risk  capital  according  to  standard  company  practice  in  a  market  economy. 
While  in  certain  clear  cut  cases,  it will  be  evident  whether  the  state is 
behaving  as  pure  entrepreneur/owner  of  a  business,  or  is  acting exclusively 
as  the  provider  of  aid,  in  many  cases  it will  be  necessary  to  proceed  to 
a  detailed examination  of  the  facts  of  the  particular  case  in  order  to 
reach  a  decision  which  could  involve  both  elements. 
26.  In  the  case  of  Loans,  the  Commission  would  have  regard  to whether 
the  loans  were  made  on  normal  commercial  terms  and  whether  such  loans  would 
have  been  available  from  a  commercial  bank.  In  some  Member  States it is 
normal  practice,  or  even  obligatory,  for  nationalised  industries,  including 
airlines,  to  borrow  exclusively  from  the  State.  In  such  cases  the  Commission 
will,  as  part  of  its determination  of  whether  a  Loan  was  made  on  normal 
commercial  terms,  compare  the  rate  of  interest  paid  by  the  State on  its 
borrowings  with  the  rate  charged  by  it  to  the  airline. 
(1)  Commission  Decision  of  10  March  1982  concerning  the  aid  granted  by 
the  Belgian  Government  to  an  industrial  and  commercial  group  manufacturing 
wall  coverings;  O.J.  L 138/18  of  19.5.1982. IV.  12 
27.  In  the  case  of  both  loans  and  guarantees,  regard  should  be  had  to 
whether  private .•  hareholde~s  Cif  any)  are  participating  in  the  loan  or 
guarantee  proport~onately to  their  shareholding.  If  so,  it might  safely 
be  concluded  that  it  is  a  normal  commercial  transaction.  If not,  there 
is  probably  an  aid  element,  unless  the  value  of  the  loan  or  guarantee 
is  charged  for  on  a  fully  commercial  basis. 
28.  As  in  the  case  of  loans,  the  Commission  would  have  regard  to  whether 
the  guarantee  was  or  could  be  made  on  normal  commercial  terms.  It  is  also 
possible  that  even  if the  state  charged  the  full  market  rate  for  a  guarantee, 
there  could  be  an  aid  element,  since  the  airline's overall  borrowing 
position might  be  improved,  both  as  to  rate,  amount,  and  other  conditions. 
29.  The  general  principles  contained  in  paragraph  18  are  also  applicable 
to  guarantees.  More  specifically  the  conditions  laid  down  in  paragraph  18 
apply  to  guarantees  in  a  modified  form  to  take  account  of  their  special 
characteristic,  which  is  that  a  )ayment  is  only  made  on  the  occurence  of 
a  contingent  event.  Guarantees  are  in  practice  so  common  that  at  least 
initially the  Commission  will  concentrate  on  the  conditions  on  which  they 
are  granted.  In  its view  it  is  important  that  the  guarantees  should  be 
finite  in  time  and  amount;  that  they  should  not  automatically  operate  as 
soon  as  an  airline  incurs  a  loss  but  should  leave  room  for  commercial 
pressures  to  operate.  If  they  are  called  upon  the  Commission  should  be 
notified;  and  the  call  must  entail  an  examination  of  the  need  to  take 
action  to  restore  the  airlines'  finances  and  a  justification if  no  action 
is  proposed.  This  examination  should  be  carried out  in  consultation  with 
the  Commission. 
30.  Some  of  the  elements  to  which  the  Commission  would  have  regard 
include  : 
(a)  The  past  and  projected  rate  of  return  on  capital  employed  in  the 
airline. 
(b)  Past  and  projected  level  of  dividend  payments  by  the  airline,  taking 
into  account  retained profits. (c)  The  relative efficiency and  viability of  the airline. 
(d)  The  debt-/equity  ratio of  the  airline. 
(e)  The  foregoing  by  the  state of  a  normal  return  on  equity  capital. 
(f)  The  write-off  by  the  state of  equity  capital  invested  by  it  in 
the  airline. 
(g)  The  purpose  of  the  contribution. 
31.  In  the  case  of  equity  contributions,  once  again,  if  the other 
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shareholders  contribute  proportionately  to their  shareholding,  the 
transaction  is probably  a  normal  commercial  one.  If,  however,  the  other 
shareholders  do  not  contribute  proportionately,  this  provides  prima 
facie  evidence  of  aid.  Howeyer,  since  of  course  in  normal  commercial 
situations  capital  contrib~tions are  not  always  made  proportionately, 
further  examination  could  reveal  a  valid  commercial  reason  for  the 
contribution  being disproportionate. }'/.14 
VI.  Transparency 
32.  As  has  been  noted  the  Treaty  is entirely neutral  as  between  private 
enterprise  and  nationalised  industries.  It  follows  that  the  Commission's 
objective  should  be  not  to  interfere with  the  methods  of  financing 
nationalised  industries  when  similar  to  commercial~; Jctices.  As  will have 
been  seen  in  sectiJn v,  certain  financial  transactions  between  states 
and  publicly owned  enterprises  sometimes  constitute a  state aid,  and 
sometimes  are  normal  commercial  transactions  between  the  owner  of  a 
business  and  that  business.  Given  the  extensive  role of  public  enterprises 
iQ-the  airline sector,  this problem  is  bound  to arise  frequently.  However, 
.t~. 
there  is  no  consistent  pattern of  reporting  of  such  transactions  by  the 
Member  States  to  the  Commission,  since  Member  State's  interpretations 
of  whether  a  particular  transaction  constitutes  an  aid  is  bound  to  vary. 
Thus  there  is  a  serious  risk  that  in  the  absence  of  transparency  in  the 
financial  relations  between  Member  States  and  publicly  owned  enterprises, 
the  state aid  rules  cannot  be  applied effectively to  both  private  and 
public  undertakings. 
33.  Similar  problems  caused  by  lack  of  transparency  in other  sectors 
of  the  economy  led  the  Commission  to  issue  Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC  C1) 
of  25  June  1980  o~ the  transparency  of  financial  relations  between  Member 
States  and  public  undertakings.  This  did  not  apply  to air transport  Cin 
common  with  other  forms  of  transport).  The  purpose  of  this directive, 
which  is  based  on  Article  90.3  of  the  Treaty  is  to  ensure  that  the 
financial  relations  between  public  authorities  (2)  and  public  undertakings  (3) 
are  transparent  so  that  the  public  funds  made  available  to  public  under-
takings,  directly or  through  the  intermediary  of  public  undertakings  or 
financial  institutions  and  the  use  of  which  those  funds  are  actually  put, 
emerge  clearly. 
. I . 
(1)  O.J.  N°  L 195  of  29.7.1980,  page  35. 
(2)  A "public  authority"  is  defined  in  the directive  as  meaning  the  State 
and  regional  or  local  authorities. 
(3)  A "public  undertaking''  is defined  in  the  directive  as  meaning  any 
undertaking  over  which  the  public  authorities  may  exercise directly or 
indirectly a  dominant  influence  by  virtue of  their  ownership  of  it, 
their financial  participation therein,  or  the  rules  which  govern  it. 
Such  a  dominant  influence  is  to  be  presumed  when  these  authorities 
directly  or  indirectly  in  relation  to  an  undertaking  hold  the  major  part 
of  the  undertaking's  subscribed  capital,  or  control  the  majority  of  the 
votes  attaching  to  shares  issued  by  the  undertakings,  or  can  appoint 
more  than  half  of  the  members  of  the  undertaking's  administrative, 
managerial  or  supervisory  body. IV.15 
The  transparency of  financial  relation which  is  to be  ensured  is to  apply 
in  particular  to the  setting-off of  operating  losses,  the  provision of 
capital, non-refundable grants,  or  loans  on  privileged terms,  the granting 
of  financial  advantages  by  forgoing  profits or  the  recovery of  sums  due, 
the  forgoing  of  a  normal  return  on  public  funds  used,  and  also  compensation 
for  financial  burdens  imposed  by  the  public  authorities. 
34.  The  transport  sector was  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the directive 
because  to  some  extent  transparency  was  ensured  by  other  legislation for 
the  other  modes  of transport,  while  air transport  was  excluded because of 
the  need  to  make  distinct provision for  it.  The  Commission  considers that 
greater  transparency  in  the  financial  relations  between  the  Member  States 
and  publicly owned  companies  in  the air transport  sector would  assist  in 
the fair  and  effective application of  the  aid  rules  to  both  private and 
public  u~dertakings.  It will  take  an  appropriate opportunity to extend 
the  scope  of  the  transparency directive also to air transport. IV.16 
VII.  Public  Service  Obligations 
35.  Article  77  does  not  apply  to air transport.  The  question,  therefore, 
arises  whether  there  is  a  need  to  introduce  Legislation,  based  on  article 
84.2,  so  as  to  apply  a  provision  similar  to article  77  to air transport. 
36.  The  concept  of  public  service  in  the  Treaty  involves  an  activity, 
exercised either  by  a  publicly or  privately owned  enterprise,  which  is 
basically  in  the  public  interest  and  carried out  under  governmental  supervision 
and  regulation. 
37.  A public  service obligation  is defined  in  Regulation  1191/69  <which 
does  not  apply  to air  transport)  as  an  obligation  imposed  on  a  transport 
enterprise,  which  the  enterprise  would  not  assume  if considering only  its 
commercial  interests,  including  the  obligation to operate  <certain  routes, 
categories  of  traffic  minimum: conditions  as  to  kind  and  frequency  of  service), 
the  obligation to  carry  (at  specified  rates  and  subject  to  certain  conditions), 
and ,ariff obligations"  (i.e.  to  apply  for  certain  types  of  traffic or  on  certain 
routes  rates  not  in  conformity  with  the  commercial  interests of  the  enterprise). 
38.  Apart  from  definitions,  Regulation  1191/69  also  Lays  down  the  circumstances 
in  which  compensation  for  a  public  service obligation  may  be  paid.  The  essential 
rule  is that  Member  States  must  terminate  public  service obligations,  or  if that 
is  not  feasible  provide  compensation.  New  public  service obligations  are  only 
to  be  imposed  if  they  are  essential  for  the  provision  of  an  adequate  transport 
service. 
39.  The  Regulation  also  Lays  down  certain  procedural  rules.  In  summary,  the 
enterprise applies  for  the  termination  of  the  public  service obligation  and  if 
the  state  is unwilling  to  permit  the  enterprise  to  cease  performing  the  public 
service obligation  it  is obliged  to  provide  compensation  as  calculated  in 
accordance  with  the  rules  Laid  down  in  the  regulation. 
40.  In  considering  the  necessity  of  introducing  Legislation  so  as  to  apply 
provisions  similar  to article  77  and  Regulation  1191/69  to air transport,  the 
Commission  has  taken  into account  the  advice  offered  by  the  experts  at  the 
meetings  with  the  national  experts  held  during  1981  and  1982,  on  state aids 
to  the air transport  sector,  as  well  as  the  information  provided  by  the  Member 
States  on  public  service obligations  in  the  sector. IV.17 
41.  Three  Member  States  informed  the  Commission  that  they  have  the  right 
to  impose  public  service obligations  on  airlines  but  in  one  case  it  seems  that 
they  are  not  currently  being  imposed.  It  is, of  course,  possible  that  the~e are 
other  cases,  where  the  State  imposes  a  public  service obligation,  but  fails  to 
provide  compensation. 
42.  A prel  minary  examination  of  the  aids  reported  to  the  Commission  as 
being  compensat1on  for  public  service obligations,  reveals  that  to  a  Large 
extent  they  could  probably  be  considered  within  the  context  of article 92. 
43.  On  the  types  of  public  service obligation,  which  have  been  reported 
~~to the  Commission  <some  of  which  seem  rather  to  fall  under  article 90,  paragraph 
2),  compensation  for  the  performance  of  the  obligation  to operate  particular 
routes  within  a  Member  State  could  perhaps  be  compatible  with  article  92.1  as 
not  affecting  trade  between  Member  States,  or  under  article  92.3(a)  as  promoting 
regional  development.  The  obligation  to  operate  particular  intra-Community 
routes  could  also  perhaps  be  justified under  article 92.3Ca)  but  given  the 
likely distortion of  competition  (or  threat  thereof)  and  effect  on  trade 
between  Member  States,  which  would  result,  the  community  interest  might  not 
be  served  by  granting  a  derogation  in  such  a  case.  Furthermore,  it  is  unlikely 
that  such  an  exemption  would  be  warranted  if other  airlines  were  willing  to 
provide  the  required  Level  of  service  on  the  route  without  receiving  aid. 
44.  The  other  type  of  public  service  obligation,  of  which  the  Commission 
has  been  informed,  is  the  obligation  to  operate  a  particular  type  of  aircraft 
<see  paragraphs  11.v  and  12.vi).  Provided  the  aid  is  simply  sufficient  to  cover 
the  additional  costs  incurred  by  the  airline  in  acquiring  and  operating  the 
type  of  aircraft  in  question  as  compared  with  the  aircraft  type  chosen  by  the 
airline,  there  is  no  benefit  to  the  airline. 
45.  A further  difficulty with  the  introductiori of  compensation  for  public 
service obligations  in  this  sector  as  compared  with  others  is  that  air  transport 
is  to  a  much  greater  extent  international  whereas  a  far  higher  proportion  of 
transport  in  other  modes  is  undertaken  within  a  Member  State.  If  therefore  the 
decision  of  introducing  this  concept  is  taken  it will  be  necessary  to  have  a 
precise definition.  Otherwise  the  decision  as  to  whether  compensation  ought  to 
be  provided  for  a  public  service obligation would  be  Left  to  the  individual 
Member  States  and  there  would  be  an  even  greater  risk  of  distortion of  air 
transport  traffic  within  the  Community. IV.18 
46.  The  Commission  considers  that  the  existing provisions  contained 
in  the  Treaty  and  in particular Article 92.3 are  sufficiently flexible 
to  cope  with  the specific  cases  of  compensation  for  public  service 
obligations,  which  have  come  to  the  Commission's  attention to date. 
Should,  however,  other  cases  come  to  Light  in  the  future,  which  do  not 
fall  within the  scope  of  these  provisions,  but  which  ought  to be  approved, 
alternative procedures  will  have  to be  examined.  This  could  be  considered 
on  the basis of  a  decision  under  Article 84.2  EEC  applying  a  provision 
similar  to Article  77/EEC  as  implemented  by  Regulation  1191,  to air 
transport. IV.19 
VIII.  Implications  for  International  Routes 
47.  In  applying  the state aid  rules  the  Commission  will  pay  particular 
attention  to  the effect  of  competition  from  non  Community  carriers.  The 
Community's  airlines  are  confronted  with  competition  from  two  sides.  On  the 
one  hand,  they  face  competition  from  carriers  in  a  similar or  somewhat  more 
advanced  state of  development,  such  as  carriers  in  the  rest  of  Western  Europe 
and  the  U.S.  On  the  other  hand  they  are  in  competition  with  carriers  in  a 
Lesser  state of  development,  such  as  those  in  third world  countries,  who  are 
often subsidised  to  some  extent.  Competition  is  also  provided  by  carriers  from 
Eastern  bloc  countries,  who  sometimes  engage  in  price discounting  in  order  to 
satisfy objectives  such  as  the  maximisation  of  earnings  of  hard  currency. 
48.  In  the  absence  of  any  agreement  between  the  Community  and  third countries 
which  explicitly  covers  subsidies  in  the air transport  sector,  the  Commission 
has  concluded  that  as  a  general  rule  it  can  take  decisions  on  state aids,  which 
affect  trade  between  Member  States,  without  reference  to  the  effect  of  compe-
tition from  non  Community  carriers only  if the  non  Community  airline  in  question 
does  not  receive  aid  or other  unfair  advantage. 
49.  If  the  non  Community  carrier  was  receiving  aid  and  a  Community  carrier would 
be  put  at  the  competitive  disadvantage  with  such  a  carrier,  the  Commission  would 
consider  authorising  ~he  granti~g 9f  ~he amount  of  aid  ne~essary to  combat  the 
unfair  competition  from  the  non  Community  carrier,  while  ensuring  that  trade 
between  Member  States  was  not  affected or  not  unduly  affected. 
SO.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Chicago  Convention  (1)  contains  a  number  of 
provisions  designed  to  ensure  the  non  discriminatory  treatment  of airlines, 
irrespective of  nationality.  In  particular,  attention  is  drawn  to articles  15 
and  24  of  the  Chicago  Convention.  Article  15  p"ovides  that  airport  and  air 
navigation  charge~  imposed  by  a  State  on  aircraft  of  another  contracting 
State  shall  not  be  higher  as  to  scheduled  services  than  those  that  would  be 
paid  by  its national  aircraft  of  the  same  class  engaged  in  similar operations. 
The  same  rule  is  l~id down  for  non  scheduled  services.  Article  24  provides 
that  States  shall  exempt  fuel  on  board  an  aircraft  of  a  contracting  State 
from  customs  duties  and  other  charges.  This  provision  is  the  basis  for  the 
exemption  of  aviation  fuel  used  in  international  flights  from  taxes.  It  should 
be  noted  that  the  6th  Directive  on  Value  Added  Tax  (2)  has  the  effect  of 
exempting  the  supply  of  aircraft  fuel  from  V.A.T.,  if  it  i~  for  use  by  a 
company  engaged  essentially  in  international  air transport. 
(1)  Convention  of  International  Civil  Aviation  of  1944. 
(2)  Council  Directive of  17.5.77- O.J.  L 145/1  of  13.6.77. IV.20 
IX.  Conclusions 
(a)  Guidelines 
51.  These  guidelines  give  some  indications  of  the  Commission's  general 
attitude to aids  to airlines,  to particular  types  of  aid,  and  to  some  of  the 
more  important  issues  that  have  arisen  based  on  the  information  available  to 
it. 
52.  The  Commission's  general  attitude  towards  aids  in  the  sector  may  be 
summarised  as  follows 
1.  Member  States  must  respect  their obligations  u~der article 93.3  to notify 
all  proposed state aids  or  alterations  thereto  in  advance,  so  as  to  enable 
it to  take  a  position on  the~. 
The  aid  must  be  transparent  in  the  sense  that  their effects  can  be  controlled. 
The  Commiss~on will  prevent  the  granting  of  state aids  from  resulting  in  a 
transfer  of  the difficultie·s  of  the  enterprise of  one  Member  State to  those 
of  other  Member  States  of  the  Community. 
2.  The  Commission  considers  that, despite  recent  difficulties,  the  Community's 
air  transport  sector  should  normally  be  capable  of  coping  with  market  forces. 
The  Commission,  therefore,  believes  that  article 92  should  be  applied  to 
civil aviation  in  the  same  way,  mutatis  mutandis,  as  to other  economic 
sectors.  Some  Member  States  consider  that  certain aids  compensate  for  the 
imposition of  a  public  service obligation on  their airlines.  The  Commission 
considers  that  the  possibilities of  the  Treaty and  in  particular article 92 
§  3  provide  sufficient  flexibility  to  handle  the  specific  cases  of  which  it 
has  knowledge  or  which  may  be  notified  in  the  future.  However,  it will  keep 
this  subject  under  review.  In  addition,  the  Commission  will,  in  considering 
individual  state aid  cases,  take  into  account  whether  undertakings  fall 
within  the  scope  of  article 90.2. 
3.  The  Commission  in  its application  of  the  state aid  rules  will  give  primary 
attention to  the  intracommunity  aspects.  It  will  operate  these  rules  in 
such  a  manner  as  not  to  put  Community  carriers at  a  competitive  disadvantage 
with  carriers  from  third  countries,  who  are  either subsidised  or  otherwise 
benefit  from  preferential  treatment. 
4.  As  described  in detail  in  paragraphs  20  to  31,  the  provisions  of  capital, 
loans  or  of  guarantees  by  a  government  to  an  airline,  which  it owns,  may 
constitute either an  aid,  a  normal  commercial  transaction  between  the  owner 
of  an  enterprise  and  that  enterprise or  a  mixture  of  the  two.  Therefore, 
it  has  to  be  determined  in  particular  cases  if there  is  an  aid  element  and 
if so  whether  it  is  justifiable. 5.  The  Commission  can  only  authorise  aids  where  there  is a  compensatory 
justification in  terms  of  the  common  interest.  Aids  whose  main 
purpose  is to  cover  an  airline's operating  loss  would 
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not  normally  be  considered  as  being  compatible  with  the  common  market. 
However,  in  cases  where  the  financial  situation of  an  airline  company. is 
particularly precarious  but  where  real  possibilities for  improvement  exist 
the  Commission  could  authorise  the  aids  required  for  recovery  of  the·enter-
prise provided  that  these  interventions  were  an  integral  part of  a  programme 
containing  adequate  measures  for  restoring  the  financial  viability and 
competitiveness  of  the  enterprise within  a  reasonable  time  period. 
6.  Subject  to  the  facts  of  particular  cases,  aids  to assist  air services  in 
economically  under-developed  regions  of  the  Community  would  be  acceptable, 
provided  the difficulties of  the  region  were  assessed  in  a  national  and 
Community  context. 
7.  The  Commission  will,  in  general,  tend  to  accept  aids  which  are  provided 
to  facilitate  the  operation  of  domestic  routes.  In  particular,  the  Commission 
considers,  that  aid  granted  to  purely  domestic  airlines,  which  do  not  have 
any  direct  or  indirect  Links  with  international  airlines  is unlikely  to 
fall  within  the  terms  of  article 92  et  seq.  of  the  Treaty.  Nevertheless 
such  aids  would  be  incompatible  with  the  common  market  if  they  had  the 
effect  of  diverting  significant  volumes  of  international  traffic  into  the 
Member  State  in  question or  of  allowing  carriers  to  cross-subsidize their 
international  operations. 
8.  Aid  provided  to airlines  to encourage  the  purchase  and  operation 
of  specific  aircraft  would  not  be  considered  as  conferring  a 
benefit  on  the airline,  provided  such  an  aid  merely  covered  the  additional 
costs  to  the  airline of  purchasing  and  operating  an  aircraft  other  than 
the  optimum  from  its  commercial  viewpoint,  but  as  an  indirect  aid  to  the 
manufacturer,  and  would  be  assessed  as  such. 
9.  The  Commission  does  not  intend  to  take  any  action  in  respect  of  the  exemption 
of  aviation  fuel  from  taxation,  since  the  same  exemption  is  granted by  all 
Member  States,  in  accordance  with  their obligations  under  the  Chicago 
Convention.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  risk  of  a  distortion of  competition IV.  22 
between  airlines  from  different  Member  States.  In  fact  the  Commission  has 
proposed  to  the  Council  to  continue  these  exonerations. 
10.  The  exemption  from  value  added  tax  of airline tariffs  Cboth  as  regards 
the  domestic  and  international  sections of  an  international  route)  is 
permitted  by  the  sixth  Directive  on  Value  Added  Tax  (1),  and  will  continue 
unless  eliminated after  the  forthcoming  review  of  the  working  of  the 
Directive.  The  Commission  is satisfied that  this  exemption  does  not  result 
in  a  distortion of  competition  between  the  Community's  airlines. 
(b)  legislation 
53.  As  mentioned  in  paragraph  52~7 it does  not  seem  necessary  to 
introduce  new  legislation  in  respect  of  public  service obligations. 
However,  the  Commission  will  keep  the  subject  under  review.  In addition, 
it will,  in  considering  individual  state aid  cases,  take  into account 
whether  undertakings  falling within  the  scope  of article 90.2  need  state 
aid  for  the  performance  of  the  tasks  assigned  to  them. 
54.  As  explained  in  paragraphs  32  to  34,  the  Commission  intends  to 
extend  a  directive under  article 90.3  on  the  transparency of  financial 
relations  between  Member  States  and  public  undertakings  to  the  air 
transport  sector  in  due  time. 
(c)  Consideration  by  the  Commission  of  Existing Aids 
55.  ALL  ten  Member  States  have  supplied  information  to  the  Commission 
on  the state aids  granted  by  them  and/or their financial  relations  with 
airlines.  The  Commission  is  therefore  in  a  position  to  review,  in  coope-
ration with  each  Member  State,  under  the  provisions  of  article 93.1, 
the  systems  of  aid existing  in  the  Member  States  which  were  not  notified 
in  advance  to  it.  If as  a  result of  this examination  it  concludes  that 
certain aids  are  incompatible  with  the  common  market  appropriate  measures 
will  be  taken.  The  Commission  will  ensure  that  the different  Member  States 
are  treated equitably. 
(1)  Council  Directive of  17.5.77 - O.J.  L 145/1  of  13.6.77. ANNEX  V 
Proposal  for  a  Council  Decision  __  / __  /EEC  on  non-discrimination 
and  standstill provisions  in air transport 
·-------··---- ---- ·-·-·--- --- --·--··--·-·------ -- ·-·-·-- ---- -- -·-·----- ·- --·-· -----
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COH1'1UNITIES, 
Having  regard  to the Treaty-establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community  and  in particular Article 84(2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to the proposal  from  the  Commission, 
Having  regard  to the Opinion of  the  European  Parliament  (1), 
Having  regard to the Opinion  of the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  (2), 
.\ihereas  for  the purposes  of  facilitating  the  adoption of  a 
common  air transport policy Member  States  should  in  the 
meantime  avoid  taking measures  which  would  lead  to further 
divergence of national policies  and  which  in their direct or 
indirect effects would  make  the  situation of airlines of other 
member  States  less  favourable, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION 
Article  1 
Until  common  rules  have  been  adopted  on  the basis of Article 
84(2)  of  the  Treaty on  a  particular matter,  no  Member  State 
may,  without  the  unanimous  approval  of the  Council,  make  the 
various  provisions  governing  the  subject,  at the  time  of  the 
adoption of this  Decision,  less  favourable  in their direct or 
indirect effects  on  air carriers of other  Member  States as 
compared  with air carriers who  are nationals of that State. 
----·- -·  ~- -- --··- - --·- --- - --- -- --·-
( 1)  ( 2) v.  2 
Article  2 
l,!ember  States  shall  take measures  to ensure  that arrangements 
at airports,  including the  system or  systems  for  the allocation 
of slots are  not  less  favourable  in their direct or indirect 
effects on air carriers of other l\1ember  States  than  on  their 
own  air carriers. 
Article  3 
Member  States shall  not  render their national  legislation,  laws 
and  administrative  measures  with  respect  to the  access  to the 
market  on  routes  between  Member  States of air carriers esta-
blished in Member  States less liberal than  those  in  force  on 
the  1  February  1984. 
Article  4 
1.  The  r1ember  States  shall,  before  1  January  1985,  and  after 
consultation \'lith  the  Commission,  take  the  necessary  steps 
to  amend  their  laws  and  administrative  provisions  to  comply 
with this Decision. 
2.  The  f·1ember  States  shall  communicate  to the  Commission  all 
laws  and  administrative provisions  made  in  furtherance  of 
this  Decision. 
Article  5 
This  Decision is addressed  to the  ~1ember States. ANNEX  VI 
Programme of Commission's  initiatives in the  field of Civil 
Aviation 1984-86 
1984 
- Proposal  on  mutual  recognition of certain  licences  and 
training in civil aviation 
- Modified  proposal  concerning air services  for  low weight 
express air cargo 
- Proposal  on  facilitation of  freight  and  passenger air 
transport  and  general aviation 
- Proposal  on  measures  to  facilitate market  access 
1985  and  1986 
Extension  to air transport of  transparency rules  for  finan-
cial relations between  f-1ember  States  and  public enterprises 
- Proposal  on  the  widening  of  the  field of activities of  non-
scheduled  services 
- Review  of  the  Directive  on  interregional air  services 
- Airport efficiency criteria 
- Proposal  on  airport charges 